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ARMED FORCES

Results of Winter Training Period

PM0606153594 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Jun 94 p 1

[Colonel Anatoliy Belousov report: "No Such Thing As Bad Weather When It Comes to Combat Training. There Are Problems, But Even They Are Surmountable. Summer Training Period in Russian Armed Forces Began 1 June"]

[Text] The winter combat training period was more difficult than ever before. Judge for yourselves: Reform of the Armed Forces continues, troop groupings and infrastructures are being set up on Russian Federation territory, the withdrawal of troops to Russian territory is being completed, and mobile forces are being created.... And all this is going on when funding for military programs is clearly inadequate, there is a huge personnel shortage, and the social problems dogging servicemen are in practice insuperable today.

Nevertheless, due credit has to be given to the Army and Navy: Despite all these difficulties, they demonstrated during the winter period that they remain wholly battle-worthy and controlled. On the whole, they fulfilled the training plans. And, a particularly important point, they proved their mettle quite well in command-staff training drills at both the strategic and the operational-strategic levels, and also in the "Baykal" and "Northwest" command staff exercises and in exercises for collective peacemaking forces and Border Troops on the Tajik-Afghan border and others. Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev noted that the weightiest successes were attained by the Strategic Missile Troops, Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, the Group of Russian Troops in the Transcaucasus, and the Leningrad Naval Base. Matters fared worse in the Pacific Fleet.

So what were the specific results with which the troops and naval forces arrived at the halfway mark? What will the emphasis be on in the summer combat training period?

Strategic Missile Troops

As Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Dolinin, our permanent correspondent for the Strategic Missile Troops, reports, during the winter half of the year the troops resolved a triple task, as it were. New regiments equipped with "Topol" missiles were brought into the effective combat strength, old missile complexes which had served double their recommended lifetime were removed from alert duty, and the testing of the new "Topol M" missile progressed vigorously at the test range in Mirnyy.

However, alert duty did not cease even for a minute against the backdrop of this extensive and complex work. Planned combat training is also progressing smoothly. Russian Federation Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev, Ivan Rybkin, and Vladimir Shumeyko, who visited the Strategic Missile Troops this year, made a high assessment of the missilemen's combat readiness.

When it comes to the plans and tasks for the summer training period, Lieutenant General Viktor Yesin, chief of

the Strategic Missile Troops Main Staff Operations Directorate, stressed, then the triple task which was being resolved in the winter training period remains for the summer too.

Ground Troops

The tasks for the winter period were on the whole fulfilled by the Ground Troops. Although only 70 percent of the planned number of exercises were conducted during the winter training period. The problems of maintaining combat readiness, improving the combat skill of troops, and bolstering discipline and law and order are now being tackled. Questions of manning units and combined units remain acute. At present primary officer posts are just over 60 percent filled, and the shortfall in the numbers of soldiers and sergeants is even greater. So it is planned to hire 90,000 men on a contract basis this year.

Air Forces

An effective summary of the results of the winter training period, Colonel Gennadiy Lisenkov, press center chief, reports, was the "West-94" command-staff exercise conducted under the leadership of Air Force Commander-in-Chief Colonel General of Aviation Petr Deynekin. This exercise involved strategic bombers, fighters, frontal aviation, and practically all Air Force communications centers, and combat engineer service subunits and rear services subunits.

The crews performing alert duty proved to be up to the mark. The large strategic formations commanded by General V. Kozlov and General A. Vasilyev were commended.

But the airmen also have plenty of problems. The improvement of existing aviation formations, which are left with only "fourth generation" combat equipment, has been set for the summer training period and the period through the year 2000. New hardware has to be mastered quickly. However, there are shortages at every step here. The dearth of aviation fuel, spare parts, and specialist equipment used at airfields is being felt keenly....

Navy

The substantial changes in the foreign and domestic situation required that the entire system of views on the organizational development and utilization of naval forces be radically revised. A fitting concept was elaborated. By the end of the winter training period substantial measures to reform the Navy and give it qualities consonant with present conditions were completed. Combat service and alert duty remained the most important indicators of the real status and activity of the Navy. These were implemented according to plan by the forces of all fleets in the light of the actual situation and operational need. Daily combat service at sea and alert duty at bases was performed by several dozen ships, and almost one half of these were submarines.

According to the plans, in the summer training period ships will continue to resolve tasks at sea, including in the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and also the Barents and Okhotsk Seas, and in the Atlantic Ocean.

Air Defense Troops

During the last training year the only regiment in Russia's Armed Forces to be deemed excellent was the Air Defense regiment under the command of Colonel Anatoliy Akulinin. It is too early to say what the situation will be this year, but the fact that the leaders inspired others in their wake is indisputable.

As Commander-in-Chief Colonel General of Aviation Viktor Prudnikov stressed, though numbers were cut, the quality and reliability of the Air Defense Troops were maintained.

The "Northwest" and "Repulse-94" command staff exercises tested and rehearsed the principles of the organization and control of various types of Troops and air defense systems. During the training period 31 exercises were carried out, and five surface-to-air missile units and seven aviation regiments conducted live fire. Those serving under Lieutenant General Anatoliy Bochkov were deemed to be the best. Particular attention will be paid during summer combat training to the system for monitoring Russia's airspace and to improving the missile early warning system. The principle for structuring the air defense system is also to change. It will become territorial.

The main efforts will be channeled into developing teamwork and coordination and training crews and subunits for action in a complex, rapidly changing situation, making maximum use of the combat potential of hardware and arms. Exercises will be conducted jointly with units from other branches of the Armed Forces.

But, our permanent correspondent for the Air Defense Troops Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Ivanov reports, unless it proves possible soon to rectify the situation regarding the provision of units with resources making it possible to carry out combat training systematically, combat readiness may decline.

As we can see, it has not yet proved possible in all branches of the Armed Forces to organize the training process the way it should ideally be. The country and the Army are going through only too difficult a time. So all the more respect is warranted by those military districts, combined units, and units where, in the face of objective difficulties, people are finding a way of retaining a planned and systematic approach and carrying out the necessary drills with command personnel and training exercises. The combat readiness of the Army and Navy is based on such military formations, and they primarily determine the face of Russia's present Armed Forces.

Yarov on Servicemen's Social Protection

PM0706162394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Jun 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Russian Federation Government Deputy Chairman Yu.F. Yarov by Ivan Ivanyuk under the "Interlocutor for Today" rubric; place, date not given: "Petty Economies in Maintaining the Army Are Impermissible"]

[Text] [Ivanyuk] For many years social policy in our country was built around the paternalist principle—the state's

"fatherly" concern for its citizens. What approaches are being established now and how can they be realized?

[Yarov] If by paternalism you mean ostentatious "philanthropy" for the sake of creating an illusion of concern for the interests of working people, then I cannot agree that our state feigned concern for its citizens. Our social achievements since 1917 have been widely recognized, and they can hardly be underrated now. It is quite another matter that these achievements were founded on a certain impersonality.

Today, however, the character of social policy is radically changing; it is now increasingly oriented toward assisting specific people, those who really do need assistance. And believe me, this is a very complex task, much more complex than lavishing care on absolutely everyone.

The main ways of reforming the economy and making social transformations are determined by the Russian Federation Government's program "The Development of Reforms and the Stabilization of the Russian Economy," the implementation of which was begun last year and is scheduled to run through 1995.

According to a forecast by the Russian Ministry of Economics, these social policy measures will stabilize the standard of living of the bulk of the population by the end of 1994. Citizens' income will increase 310 percent, including an increase in nominal wages, pensions, benefits, and grants of 340 percent. Although the budget resources allocated for 1994 can only ensure the minimum social guarantees for Russian citizens.

[Ivanyuk] What priorities has the government specified in the social sphere for servicemen and members of their families?

[Yarov] Bearing in mind the limited possibilities of a newspaper interview, I will only dwell on the main points. First and foremost, we have finished formulating the legal basis of social protection for servicemen and persons discharged from military service within the framework of implementing the Russian Federation Law "On the Status of Servicemen." The formulation and implementation of a blueprint for targeted social support for servicemen who find themselves in the most unfortunate situations is extremely urgent: We are talking about servicemen who are without an apartment, who have been discharged without a civilian profession, who are performing their service in military conflict zones and distant garrisons, and who have been forced to redeploy to garrisons that have not been fully prepared. Moreover, we intend to ratify a list of minimum social conditions without which it is forbidden to implement measures to cut back and redeploy troops.

Also on the agenda is the introduction of a system of measures to ensure active enlistment of nonbudgetary resources, land and other potential resources, real estate belonging to military subunits and formations scheduled for cutbacks, and also citizens' private resources in order to resolve the housing problems being experienced by servicemen. Let me mention another topical problem—the

conclusion of interstate agreements ensuring civilized living conditions and legal guarantees for former servicemen in CIS countries.

[Ivanyuk] The government believes that the country should not be turned into one big social security department, we need to create incentives to earn money. But servicemen cannot do this and most of them believe that the state is failing to compensate them adequately for the expenses of their nomadic lifestyle and the lack of housing, nor is it providing them with the opportunity to find jobs for their wives or a normal education for their children, and so forth. What do you think? And what is to be done with the law "On the Status of Servicemen," half of which does not work?

[Yarov] Of course, the government's position on this question cannot be applied to servicemen by virtue of the specific nature of their activity. The Russian Government believes that the social protection of servicemen and members of their families is a task for the state. The program of priority state measures to strengthen social protection of Russian Federation servicemen, persons discharged from military service, and members of their families in conditions of economic and military reform and the list of state measures to implement the Russian Federation Law "On the Status of Servicemen" are geared toward this task and have been adopted because of it.

The following state programs have been ratified: To provide housing from 1993 through 1995 to servicemen, persons discharged from military service, internal affairs organs staff, and members of their families; and to withdraw Russian forces from the territory of other states and subsequently provide them with housing and facilities.

As regards the second part of your question, I must remind you that the law "On the Status of Servicemen" is the first legislative act to establish a system of fundamental rights and social guarantees for servicemen and persons discharged from military service. It was enthusiastically adopted although it was elaborated in special conditions when experience of the systematic solution of this problem had not yet been built up and confrontation between the legislative and executive branches could already be felt, and also the state's economic potential was not forecast, which meant that a number of benefits could not be delivered. In some cases the text of the law did not specify the sources of financing. The legislators also made flagrant errors. For example, the law affects compensation to servicemen for expenditure incurred on treatment at sanatoriums and health resorts. The benefit introduced by the law has made the previous situation even worse (25 percent of servicemen's travel costs are paid, and 50 percent of their family's).

Nevertheless, during 1993 the government adopted 11 decrees designed to implement the law. Among the issues resolved was the question you yourself raised about finding jobs for servicemen's wives. This has been resolved by the Russian Government's decrees No. 1215 and 1217 dated 22 November 1993.

At the present time the government is working on five elaborated draft decrees, the adoption of which will bring us

close to implementing the law in full (on the procedure for introducing benefits in respect of payments for apartments, municipal services, and apartment telephones, travel on public transport, insuring the property of servicemen serving in "trouble spots," and providing financial assistance for individual and cooperative housing construction). A total of 10 draft decrees are in the final stage of coordination. In order to implement a whole series of other benefits, the government must obtain from the legislators a law on amending and adding to 10 legislative acts in connection with the adoption of the law "On the Status of Servicemen." The State Duma is planning to examine this draft law in the near future.

[Ivanyuk] Last year considerable funds were earmarked for local organs of power for the construction of housing for servicemen released into the reserve, but a considerable proportion of these funds did not reach their destination. Will the picture not be repeated this year?

[Yarov] I should like, in answering this question, first of all to try to remove the prejudice with regard to local organs of power. The majority cannot be accused of squandering the funds allocated for the construction of housing for those released from military service. The problem is far more complex. And its roots lie primarily in the country's economic potential.

Although complaints could be leveled against some of them for their inability to deal with the funds they have received and sometimes, why hide it, the desire to resolve problems of the development of mains utility networks and the urban infrastructure using some of the appropriations received from the federal coffers for the construction of housing for those released from military service. The money would seem to have gone nowhere except into construction but at the same time the number of commissioned apartments can only be expressed in symbolic figures. Thus, under equal conditions, in 1993 the Sverdlovsk Oblast Administration managed to ensure the commissioning of 71 percent of the planned level of housing, the St. Petersburg Administration 69 percent, the Tomsk and Kemerovo Oblast Administrations 63 percent, and the Tyumen Oblast and Moscow City Administrations 60 percent. At the same time in Novgorod and Amur Oblasts only 2 percent of the apartments planned for the year were constructed while in Pskov, Astrakhan, and Kostroma Oblasts the figure was 5 percent, in Tver and Kaliningrad Oblasts and Maritime Kray the figure was 6 percent, and in Leningrad Oblast 9 percent.

This year the question of providing housing for this category of citizens will be no easier to resolve. At the same time there are no grounds for pessimism. Effective steps are being taken to ensure the rhythmical nature of financing and the implementation of regional programs. The ministries and departments involved have now submitted to the government a draft decree on the procedure for rendering free financial aid to servicemen and citizens released from military service who have joined housing construction cooperatives and are constructing individual houses.

As for the Federation components, we intend to build relations with them according to the following scheme:

When you have received money from the federal budget for the construction of housing for those released from military service, you must be responsible for this money in terms of erecting the maximum number of apartments.

[Ivanyuk] The basic guidelines of social policy for this year provide for the elaboration and implementation of comprehensive regional programs for the close accommodation of and rational provision of jobs for servicemen. Yet plans of this kind existed last year and the year before that.... Is all this not Utopian? You familiarized yourself with the experience of the social adaptation of former servicemen when you were in St. Petersburg. How do you assess it?

[Yarov] No, it is no Utopia. After all, today the regions have acquired the opportunity to elaborate their own programs and to attract for their implementation both the funds earmarked by the budget and other nontraditional sources of finance and to use all available reserves and conditions. This became possible after the Russian Federation president signed the 24 December 1993 edict no. 2281 "On the Elaboration and Introduction of Nonbudget Forms of Investment in the Housing Sphere," which provided the opportunity for the active implementation of these programs.

If we are speaking of the regional program for Leningrad Oblast, then it is still too early to assess the real successes here. I have had occasion to criticize them more than praise them.

[Ivanyuk] What do the Armed Forces mean for you personally? To judge by the consistency with which you investigate servicemen's problems this is connected not only with the fact that you are leader of the interdepartmental commission for the social questions of servicemen and members of their families. Are you personally also not indifferent to their problems?

[Yarov] It has so happened that in my work I have had to collaborate a lot with the military and to visit military units and ships. So I know of the Armed Forces' problems at first hand. They existed in the past, and they exist now. And they must be resolved, and as soon as possible. The people who have devoted their lives to serving Russia and who perform the tasks set them under very hard conditions, often risking their lives, must feel the state's special concern and attention for them and their families. The petty saving of money on the maintenance of the servicemen could weaken Russian statehood and result in the collapse of the army and far greater expenditure on its restoration. You obviously agree with me that it is simply intolerable to be indifferent toward such issues.

POLICY

Higher Defense Funding at Mercy of Lobbyists

PM0706171194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Jun 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Vladimir Yermolin under "Events and Commentary" rubric: "The 18-Trillion Ruble Contest: Will Appreciation of the Country's Security Interests Prevail?"]

[Text] Again, for the umpteenth time in the last month, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is addressing the problem of the defense budget for the current year, 1994. This week the State Duma—if it does not again, for some reason, have to change the agenda—is to complete discussion of the draft Law "On the Federal Budget for 1994." As readers will be aware, military expenditure has been the focus of discussion. The government draft law specifies a figure of 37 trillion for it. Precisely this number of rubles [R] is, in the opinion of the drafters of the law, quite sufficient to cover actual defense expenditure. The Defense Ministry regards R55 trillion as the minimum sum. Since the State Duma passed the first reading of the government version 11 May, the Russian president, the head of the Russian Government, and the Federation Council have come out in favor of allocating the missing R18 trillion. A number of parliamentary factions and committees have also deemed it necessary to stress publicly their agreement with the military. These include the Committee on Economic Policy.

I would remind readers that this committee, in the person of its chairman, Sergey Glazyev, did try to "bump up" the defense budget to R55 trillion during the first reading. Many deputies voted in favor at the time, but the requisite number of votes failed to be mustered. Recommendations on the draft Law "On the Federal Budget for 1994" have now been prepared in the bowels of the Committee on Economic Policy. The amendments proposed by the committee affect a number of items in the draft law, including those coming under the "National Defense" heading. The proposed breakdown of military expenditure reads as follows: upkeep of the Armed Forces—R28 trillion; arms and military hardware purchases—R11.1 trillion; research and development—R5.1 trillion; capital construction—R7.1 trillion; Ministry of Atomic Energy expenditure—R1.2 trillion; servicemen's pensions—R2.5 trillion. A total of R55 trillion. The following question will thus be put point-blank during the second reading: CAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURE BE INCREASED WITHOUT IN SO DOING INCREASING THE BUDGET DEFICIT?

Sergey Glazyev believes it can. The committee's recommendations name two main sources of extra revenue: revenue derived from the privatization of federally owned facilities, and revenue derived from the abolition of concessions on export-import duties. The first accounts for an increase of R13.7 trillion, the second—R6.6 trillion.

In Glazyev's opinion, the sum to be derived from privatization indicated in the government draft is unjustifiably low. "Judge for yourself," the deputy says. "The nominal value of the state property undergoing privatization for money is R120 trillion. The market assessment, from the standpoint of the profitability of the property, is R15 trillion. The export side of Gazprom alone, which it has been resolved to privatize this year, is R100 trillion, while the government is planning to obtain a little more than R1 trillion in revenue from privatization." Moreover, Glazyev is convinced that a number of other opportunities to obtain revenue from the privatization of property are still not being taken into account. For example, the privatization of plots of land on which enterprises undergoing privatization are

sited, which is contained in the draft program, will yield quite a lot of revenue, particularly as the bulk of the enterprises is located within the boundaries of the big cities, where the price of land is climbing rapidly. As people will know, many enterprises were privatized with the state retaining a block of 20 to 51 percent of the shares, but, according to the parliamentarian, "The State Committee for the Management of State Property has not given to date any intelligible figures on the placement of these shares or the dividends obtained on them." Sergey Glazyev regards the sum of R15 trillion as a low estimate of the revenue from privatization and the commercial use of state property provided, of course, that, in accordance with the officially announced intentions, we end the stage of free "voucher" privatization and instill order in the milieu of state property management.

It must be stressed that Glazyev and his colleagues are talking not so much about lost privatization opportunities as fundamental changes in its implementation. They insist that the privatization program be implemented by decisions of the owner (the state).

As far as export-import duties are concerned, the potential here, in the opinion of the Committee on Economic Policy, lies not just in abolishing the illegally awarded concessions but in "boosting budgetary revenue by reducing the smuggling in of goods worth several billion dollars per annum." Establishing currency control and preventing the export of capital could also provide extra budget revenue by reducing shady transactions. I think that when Glazyev, a former minister of foreign economic relations, cites the \$20 billion to \$30 billion which Russian entrepreneurs keep in foreign bank accounts, he knows what he is talking about. The injection of even half that money into Russia's economy would substantially boost economic activity and augment the revenue side of the budget.

It should be noted that the recommendations of the Committee on Economic Policy are designed not just to boost the defense budget but also expenditure on state support for sectors of the national economy, sociocultural measures, science, medicine, and the implementation of international treaties to scrap, reduce, and limit arms. And all this through additional revenue in the light of the priorities declared in the president's message to the Federal Assembly. Through, as Sergey Glazyev put it, a "more assiduous" attitude toward state property.

It is clear that Sergey Glazyev expresses the views of a particular economic school, and his political allegiances are also entirely specific—he is a member of the Democratic Party of Russia faction—but another thing is clear too: The interests of national security should not be alien to any political force. And the question then arises: WHY HAS IT BEEN DECIDED TO COMBAT THE BUDGET DEFICIT AT THE ARMY'S EXPENSE?

There is no shortage of public assurances by statesmen that they understand the problems of the Armed Forces and share the concern over the future of the defense sector and its scientific and technical potential. But when the time comes to allocate the money, it becomes clear that the idea

of "shock savings" on defense needs is close to the heart of quite a number of government members and parliamentarians. And it is the defense budget which is the focus of attention of government and Duma debates. In our search for an answer as to why the army is so blithely made the scapegoat for everything, including economic blunders, we have already given a platform to people of the most diverse political persuasion. Here is Sergey Glazyev's opinion.

The government is deliberately pursuing an expenditure-cutting policy. Not just the Armed Forces, but higher education, health care, science, and so forth are being underfinanced. The shadow sector continues to submerge the economy, and tax revenues are declining even more quickly than output. But even in this situation the government pursues the goal of lowering inflation by reducing the budget deficit and the amount of credit issued.

This policy is based on the naive belief that, in accordance with monetarist ideas on the economy, all the remaining problems will sort themselves out automatically. If we maintain a small budget deficit, inflation will fall, investment and output will pick up, budget revenue will increase, and there will also be money for expenditure. In reality, everything in our country is heading in the opposite direction: output is in decline, budget revenue is falling, budget expenditure is also falling, nonpayment is on the increase, and inflation is intensifying; to overcome inflation they lower the budget deficit—and expenditure shrinks even further, output falls, and so forth. As the well-known proverb has it, an idiot can't do anything right. Moreover, such a policy proves to be both convenient (you can do nothing—keep the budget deficit down and wait until output picks up) and advantageous (you always have the choice of whom to give to and whom not—and, furthermore, without any responsibility). Hence the desire to reduce expenditure.

In Glazyev's opinion, those whose interests are poorly represented in the government leadership are the first to come under attack. That is to say, we are talking about a relatively new phenomenon in our life, namely, lobbying. It transpires that the economic advisability and significance for the state of a particular program are sidelined—the main thing is to get busy with your elbows. The army—like, say, scientists, doctors, and teachers—has not learned this yet. But again a question comes to mind: IF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRIME MINISTER, AND THE FEDERATION COUNCIL HAVE COME OUT IN FAVOR OF A R55-TRILLION DEFENSE BUDGET, WHO THEN IS AGAINST?

So far the State Duma has been against. But Sergey Glazyev cannot entirely accept this, if only because the Duma passed without discussion, on trust, as it were, the budget presented by the government for the second quarter of the current year. And all the holdups in financing the ratified articles [of the budget] during the first six months of the year in no way stem from the Duma. I asked Sergey Yuryevich how actively the government cooperated with the parliamentary committees in the runup to the second reading. After all, the press had reported the stance of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the intentions of Russian Head of Government Viktor

Chernomyrdin "to tinker with the defense budget." It is logical to suppose that, after that, joint work with government representatives was in full swing in the Duma committees. It turns out there was nothing of the kind. No fundamental modifications of the defense budget were proposed by the government. "The paradox of today's situation," according to Sergey Glazyev, "is that it is the Finance Ministry's decisions rather than presidential edicts or government decrees that are actually being carried out today. The Finance Ministry plays the same role in the state today as the CPSU Central Committee once did." All the budget-financed sectors are now dependent on the whim of Finance Ministry functionaries. The budget, however, is an instrument of statewide policy. The government answers—must answer—for its preparation and execution. For the time being, however, according to Glazyev, "the real money is received by those who know how decisions are made in the Finance Ministry and are consequently able to influence them."

Clearly, it has to be understood that the future of the defense sector and indeed of the entire Armed Forces is decided by financiers today. And they alone. And even if the Duma does ratify defense expenditure of R55 trillion, it could well be that no more than R37 trillion actually ends up in the defense coffers.

SO, WILL THE STATE DUMA RATIFY A "SUBSISTENCE MINIMUM" FOR THE ARMED FORCES OR NOT?

Sergey Glazyev hopes that it will, although there are more than enough grounds for pessimism: We are, after all, talking about altering the correlation of the revenue and expenditure sides. And this correlation was already ratified during the first reading. Consequently, either the budget adoption procedures will have to be violated or new, extrabudgetary funds acquired. And, of course, departmental interests (interests encumbered, moreover, by political considerations) will tell here. Admittedly, the Budget Committee—an opponent of the Defense and Economic Policy Committees—has already agreed to add another R4 trillion to the defense budget. A half-measure, to be sure, but movement for all that.

The main thing, Sergey Glazyev told me as we parted, is not to build up illusions—if the State Duma doesn't give the army and the defense sector the R18 trillion, no one else will provide them. Neither the president nor the government has any "hidden reserves."

Consequently, the sole hope is that the interests of national security, and no others, will now prevail in the State Duma.

Columnist Criticizes Concealed Military Spending

PM0806094194 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7 Jun 94 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Anatoliy Zhuravlev article under the "Day's Topic" rubric: "We Are All Hostages of the Military-Industrial Complex. Charm of the Directors' and Generals' Budget"]

[Text] On 11 May 1994, following the heartfelt speech in the State Duma by V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian

Federation Government, who declared that "the government has done the maximum possible to observe the fragile balance of everyone's interests in the draft that has been submitted," the most important indicators of the State Budget for 1994 were approved:

income	124,477.0 billion rubles [R]
expenditure.....	R194,495.31 billion
deficit.....	R70,018.31 billion
	(36 percent of the sum of expenditure).

Votes for.....237; votes against.....77; abstentions.....12.

Ten minutes after this vote it suddenly came to light that "there is a more than two-fold discrepancy in expenditure between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Defense: 87 and 37. This "discovery" was made by A. Piskunov, deputy chairman of the Duma Defense Committee.

What is this figure "37"? It is the sum of expenditure in Section V—"National Defense"—R37.126 trillion.

It turns out that the figure of R37 trillion for expenditure in respect of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, which features in all the previous versions of the State Budget submitted by the government, does not suit the military department, which secured the creation of a special commission consisting of State Duma deputies and representatives of the government and the Security Council. In a closed session the commission decided on defense expenditure in the sum of R55 trillion, i.e. 50 percent more than proposed by the government and signed by the prime minister. It is curious that the commission's corresponding protocol on this subject supposedly even has a corresponding conciliatory resolution of the Russian Federation president, but the chairman of the government knows nothing at all about this protocol. He at once confirmed this: "...I do not know who discussed this question with whom or where. It is possible to examine everything not only within the limits of a 36-percent deficit." But since R55 trillion corresponds to 41 percent [figures as published] of the budget deficit, the corresponding amendment to the Law on the State Budget did not get through. Despite repeated attempts to force through this additional expenditure.

They decided to return to this subject later, and a closed plenary session of the State Duma was even planned for 27 May to examine secret [zakrytyy] subheads of the budget. The session did not take place. I will not repeat the sham grounds for deferring this examination until 8 June this year. I believe that the deep-seated reason lies in tactics, as is customary with the military. Undisguised agitation for an increase in military spending has been mounted in the pages of the press and on radio and television during these two weeks. Even deputies on the reforming wing have begun to frighten their other colleagues with the sociopolitical consequences of underfunding the defense sphere, with the loss of military technologies, with a shortfall in export proceeds, etc. The recommendation which the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly formulated at its closed session 2 June 1994 is also along the same lines. So /the adoption of a so-called compromise military budget, but essentially an

astronomical one forcibly extorted by the bigwigs of the military-industrial complex, is virtually predetermined/ [passage between slantlines printed in boldface]. They will vote, like dear little deputies wishing to please the military, for R55 trillion for our generals and general directors [generally i generalnyye].

Before showing what this is fraught with, I should, for purposes of a clearer comparison, decipher this colossal sum somewhat:

maintenance of the Armed Forces.....R26.3 trillion
purchases and development of armament and military hardwareR17.4 trillion
capital construction and expenditure by the Ministry of Atomic EnergyR8.8 trillion
servicemen's pensionsR2.5 trillion.

Let us note that the Ministry of Defense has 2.1 million servicemen. And yet there are also many other military people in Russia. There are approximately 300,000 in the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, approximately 200,000 in the Border Troops, and almost 80,000 in the Federal Counterintelligence Service. Expenditure on these departments "sits" in Section VII—"Law-Enforcement Activity and Security Organs"—and amounts to R12 trillion.

Let us count up, dear reader, and add on to the R55 trillion the other expenditure on people who wear shoulder boards, as well as other expenditure connected with preparation for war and for other emergency situations. What used to be called "civil defense" has now acquired the name of the "Ministry for Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations..." and is headed by generals, has thousands of servicemen, and uses up approximately R2 trillion in Section XII, including R344 billion on mobilization preparation.

Does Section XI—"Replenishment of State Stocks and Reserves"—have no bearing on defense expenditure? Some R5.9 trillion is planned for this, plus almost R0.5 trillion under Section X—"Reserve Funds."

Section XIV—"Financial Assistance for Organs of State Power of Components of the Russian Federation and Local Self-Management"—contains the following interesting long line:

"—subsidies for budgets of closed administrative-territorial formations within whose bounds installations of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Atomic Energy are located."

The small town of Shkotovo-17 in Maritime Kray, or the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy-50. You will not find them on the map, but this unexpectedly slipped through in the draft State Budget: "to transfer from the Federal Budget on account of the first quarter of 1994..." subsidies in the sum of almost R3 billion each. Line by line—and R583 billion has been clocked up for a few dozen numbered cities. Is this military or nonmilitary expenditure?

There is one more "nonmilitary" subhead of expenditure—XIV [figure as published], entitled "Other State Expenditure." Military expenditure is also hidden here. For example:

—payment of allowances for dependants and children of servicemenR150 billion
—the Russian Defense-Sports-Technical Society (the former DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy]).....R9 billion
—rent for use of the Baykonur Cosmodrome..R135 billion
—the Federal Railroad Troops DirectorateR282 billion
—the Federal Road Construction Directorate under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, and othersR171 billion.

This subhead is particularly rich in concealed additional expenditure of a military nature. It includes, in addition to that enumerated, military research by the Ministry of Health, the Committee for Convention Problems of Disarmament, the State Technical Commission, and other departments headed by generals. Also hidden here is expenditure by the Federal Directorate of Special Construction with its 100,000 military construction workers and multitude of generals, other military construction directorates, corporations, etc. I managed to dig up approximately R1.5 trillion in expenditure of a military nature concealed under this subhead.

It is hardly worth denying the involvement with the military sphere of the R755 billion on the "defense industry conversion" line or the R837 billion under "realization of international treaties on the elimination, reduction, and limitation of arms."

I could enumerate still more, but I have already clocked up a sum approaching R80 trillion. I am not sure whether the R4.2 trillion contained in line IV—"Basic Research and Promotion of Scientific and Technical Progress"—(much of which will, moreover, be used in military matters) will be realized or whether Moscow, which is stuffed with military structures, will get its R3 trillion in subventions to perform the functions of the capital. I am not sure whether VUZ's [higher educational institutions] and vocational and technical schools will get R5 trillion, and culture and art R0.86 trillion. But I do not think that anyone is in any doubt that the aforementioned R80 trillion will definitely be spent. For at the beginning of the year a soldier's complete set of uniform clothes along with synthetic leather [kirzovyy] boots cost R500,000. How many wearers of boots and uniforms we have! Not counting the generals' expensive stars. All this unproductive, nonreturnable, irreversible expenditure in the State Budget will certainly be passed. This is almost 65 percent of the revenue part of the State Budget. Truly a wartime budget.

The author has gone too far, you will say. Not at all. I still have not added in expenditure on the current upkeep of military commissariats, on severance pay on being drafted for military service, on funding of military training in

technical colleges and VUZ's, expenditure under the Russian Federation Law "On the Status of Servicemen" (running to many trillions of rubles), the average monthly wages of enterprise workers at the time of their participation in military training courses, etc. In addition, hidden funding of military expenditure is provided out of the income made from selling military property and from the economic activities of economically accountable enterprises—for example, the 100 military state farms. This and other revenue is not taken into account in the budget.

By the way. The government recently submitted to the State Duma information entitled "On the Implementation of the Federal Budget for 1993." Take a look, messieurs deputies, at this very curious document.

It states, in particular: "Total revenue—R17,124.03 billion." In the "expenditure" column: line "8. Defense—R7,209 billion" (42 percent of the revenue part). Lines 2, 6, 7, 10, 16, and 21 also contain approximately R3,500 billion of additional expenditure of a military nature. Altogether, approximately 63 percent of the revenue part. This was the budget that was realized last year. In 1994 there was an attempt to lower this threshold just a little. But this attempt came up against very tough resistance from the military-industrial complex and its latter-day lobbyists in the Federal Assembly. They make everyone knuckle under: their colleagues at the voting desks, the government, the president, and you and me, the taxpayers.

We are all hostages of our military-industrial complex. No military reform is taking place in the country. The switch to professional Armed Forces is being blocked with references to Russia's special geopolitical position, and there are still many millions of soldiers. Russia's technological backwardness is being conserved. All this behind closed doors. They use mystery to conceal lies. The economic consequences of the militarized nature of the budget and of the resumption of the arms race will be catastrophic. It is time to call a halt and look back. For Russia has been living throughout the 20th century under virtual wartime conditions and under the occupying regime of its own homegrown military-industrial complex.

Grachev Performance in Brussels Wins Praise

*PM0706103194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Jun 94 p 3*

[Manki Ponomarev article: "The Russian Side Firmly Upheld Its Interests. The Western Press Acknowledges This, Commenting on the Results of the Visit to Brussels of General of the Army Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation Minister of Defense"]

[Text] The visit of General of the Army Pavel Grachev, Russian minister of defense, to Brussels at the end of May, his meetings with the NATO leadership, and his speech to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council had been planned long ago. The closer the date of the visit came, the more attention it attracted and the more frequently the Western countries' mass media carried forecasts of its course and results. Very contradictory opinions were expressed—some people even predicted the visit's total failure.

Such a pessimistic approach was evidently connected with the delay over Russia's joining the "Partnership for Peace" program, which came as a surprise to many people, and with the contradictory statements on this which came out of Moscow. "Initially Russia's position was not clear enough," Paris LE MONDE stated. Assessments of this kind only served to boost interest in the upcoming Brussels meeting.

But the most important thing was that, despite everything, Russia's authority and influence and its role in ensuring stability in Europe and throughout the world are so great that far-reaching expectations were associated with this meeting. People were expecting the talks with the Russian minister to elucidate, above all, the prospects for developing relations between the Russian Federation and NATO and, consequently, to draft a scheme of a future European security system. Naturally, they were also expecting an exposition of the fundamentals of Russian military doctrine.

Thus, Pavel Grachev was faced with a difficult task. He had to convince his former opponents and potential partners of Russia's fundamentally new approach to problems of ensuring security, to secure their approval for the principles of the Russian Federation's joining the "Partnership for Peace" program, to eliminate accusations of Moscow's neo-imperialist ambitions, and, at the same time, to uphold its right to special relations with the West, mindful of Russia's status as a great power with tremendous nuclear might and its permanent membership of the UN Security Council. This under conditions of NATO's obvious reluctance to assume additional commitments to Russia out of fear that this might bring about a weakening of the alliance's influence in the world.

There is no need to describe in detail the entire course of the Russian Federation defense minister's visit to Brussels. It received quite wide coverage in the Russian press. But I must emphasize at once that his mission succeeded. LE MONDE wrote at the end of the visit that it "made it possible to draw the sides' positions closer together and showed the goodwill for cooperation between Russia and NATO."

In the opinion of the Western press, Pavel Grachev's personal qualities played a considerable part in achieving that result. People had been expecting to see in Brussels "the jaded leader of a demoralized army," as THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote. But they saw a self-confident and firm military leader. "A good man, but dangerous," one German general commented respectfully on him in the press on returning from Brussels. London's THE TIMES wrote of the Russian minister that he "played a virtuoso game with the alliance" at the meeting in Brussels.

But it is not, of course, just a matter of Grachev himself. In the meetings with the NATO leadership he advanced a well thought-out position which had been worked out carefully together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and which had been examined and approved by the Russian Federation Security Council and president. This lent special weight to his words.

So, in Brussels the Russian side unequivocally declared that it was prepared to join NATO's partnership program in the very near future and presented its interlocutors with a document containing the main parameters of Russia's involvement in implementing it. At the same time it was proposed to prepare a large-scale program of bilateral political and military cooperation between NATO and Russia consonant with the latter's place in Europe and the world. At the same time the report on the main provisions of Russian military doctrine, which Pavel Grachev delivered at the conference of defense ministers of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council countries, emphasized that the political bases of this doctrine reflect two interconnected tasks—prevention of war and readiness to rebuff an aggressor.

According to Western press data, NATO rated highly the Russian document, which contains the main parameters of participation in the partnership program and of its realization, particularly in the military sphere. "NATO cannot treat Russia the same way as Tajikistan or Albania," FRG Defense Minister Volker Ruehe declared. "Russia must become a strategic partner of NATO and feel that people reckon with it as such."

I could also cite other statements and assessments of this kind concerning the results of the Brussels meeting. Many other articles, however, have also appeared in the Western press. The reaction to these results expounded in them was restrained, to put it mildly, and sometimes even sharply negative. A statement by Sergio Balanzino, deputy secretary general of the alliance, that it is no good Russia reckoning on special status, since all are equal in the partnership program, was cited, for example. "The North Atlantic Alliance has no intention of adopting any documents that would endow Russia with special rights," he declared. Germany's FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE regarded Russia's desire to legitimate consultations with NATO on questions of European security as an attempt to erode the entire North Atlantic Alliance. Britain's DAILY TELEGRAPH pointed out that NATO must make the development of cooperation with Russia dependent on "Moscow's conduct in the near abroad." At the same time it is frequently emphasized that such guardedness is perfectly justified, since "NATO must be ready for a worsening of the situation in Russia."

Particular skepticism was shown in the West in respect of the substance of the Russian military doctrine. It is said, in particular, that its provisions make intervention in the near abroad possible. In an interview in the newspaper LE FIGARO British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd did, indeed, admit that Russia has special interests here, but he emphasized that concern for them "must not transcend international law." Other doctrinal provisions were also criticized.

What can be said about all these attacks? To some extent they reflect the essence of the debate in Brussels. This is on the one hand. On the other, they attest that Pavel Grachev firmly upheld Russia's interests and did not forgo them, despite all the pressure that was put on him. Russia is joining the partnership program with a sense of its own

dignity and is sure that it will be able to arrange fully equal and constructive cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance.

Shaposhnikov Urges 'Nonbloc Coexistence'

PM0306130194 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jun 94 p 6

[Article by Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov: "How Should We Shape NATO? Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov Suggests We Consider This Issue"]

[Text] The chiefs of the leading Russian Federation mass media recently received an official invitation to visit NATO Headquarters in Brussels—to familiarize themselves with the organization in greater detail. The invitation was hardly an accident—the NATO leadership currently has a considerable interest in ensuring more vigorous support for its "Partnership for Peace" program from Russia's fourth estate.

Within Russia itself the arguments about whether or not to join the NATO program have been raging for three months now. According to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's information, the Russian Federation president and Foreign Ministry leaders received a report on this subject 24 Mss from Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, currently Boris Yeltsin's representative at the "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has also learned that the marshal did not address himself to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry because of the absolute inability, in his view, of certain military department leaders to take other opinions on board.

[Shaposhnikov begins] ...In the postwar period politicians in the leading countries wasted a historic chance to strengthen allied relations between the states and peoples which defeated fascism and to offer the world new conditions for normal coexistence without the threat of military confrontation. In subsequent decades huge efforts were needed to convince people of the fruitlessness of these kinds of relations.

There are now grounds for believing that our relations are moving to a qualitatively new state—from distrust to cooperation, from confrontation to partnership, from the arms race to arms cuts. Naturally these processes are complex, multifaceted, and sometimes ambiguous. Also ambiguous is their assessment by our society—which has to be taken into account. But if mutual extremism in assessing events, phenomena, and trends is eschewed, the question still arises: Why has NATO not been disbanded if it has no enemies and there is no confrontation? In fact, the bloc is beginning to expand.

The fairness of this question is obvious even to NATO members themselves, since, under the conditions of detente, the bloc would, figuratively speaking, be "unemployed." Having lost its simple and comprehensible guideline of the image of the enemy, military force—and not just NATO's—is today in a profound ideological crisis. This is why the bloc participants have been looking for a raison d'être for several years now. One idea they have come up with is the "Partnership for Peace" program, which allows NATO to exist,

but in a new and broader makeup, with its claims to the establishment of a "new world order" under its flag disguised.

Against this backdrop Russia's passivity is unjustifiable

... The invitation to participate in the program leaves Russia with a difficult and crucial choice to make. Let us look at the likely scenarios and possible consequences of this choice.

Were Russia to unconditionally sign "Partnership," NATO's influence would extend east to the Pacific and the Chinese border—which would not only upset the balance of power in the East but could also lead to a resumption of confrontation with our great eastern neighbor. Other negative consequences are also possible.

Were Russia not to sign "Partnership," it could find itself isolated from Western countries, and the borders of the NATO bloc would come right up to our own borders. This could be followed by the breakdown of the trust and mutual understanding achieved during the detente period and would provide favorable grounds for the reemergence of the Cold War—something that the world has grown tired of

Raising the question of Russia's special role in "Partnership" is also not the best "approach," since it is seen as a negative by other partner countries (owing to its similarity to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact). If their views are disregarded and agreement is reached with the leading NATO countries on this kind of role for Russia, then this would again be a case of hypocrisy and disguised hegemonism unworthy of great Russia and its proclaimed principles of living without any elder or junior brothers

Consequently we need to seek a solution which on the one hand would release Russia from what is, for it, an unacceptable choice while on the other hand confirming its role and importance in the world community through its ability to propose formulas that are not only consonant with its prestige but are shared by many countries

The peoples of the world, not only now but always, are united not by vestiges of the past in the form of military blocs but on a more noble basis, the essence of which continues to be trust, cooperation, and security. Consequently the world community needs not military blocs but more civilized mechanisms for regulating their relations. Such mechanisms exist—the United Nations, the CSCE, and others. The CIS and its structures can be listed among these organizations with certain provisos

But, under the new conditions, all these organizations are insufficiently effective in ensuring proper trust, harmony, and security in the world. Thus, there is a need to reform and improve both the world organization (the United Nations), and regional organizations (the CSCE, the CIS, and so forth), while, on the other hand, dismantling military blocs and transforming them into peacekeeping military mechanisms as components of the aforesaid political organizations.

This is the essence of the concept of nonbloc coexistence among states

And it should be Russia that proposes it, reaffirming its genuine adherence to peace, equal rights, trust, cooperation, and democracy and its desire to travel the road of reform, not merely becoming part of the economic area of the leading countries and sometimes a raw-material appendage, but also not rejecting the opportunity for cooperation on an equal footing with all countries.

Building this concept envisages the existence of a worldwide (main) organization (the United Nations) and its derivatives—regional structures. The worldwide organization would deal with general and more important issues, while the regional structures would deal with individual (chastnyye) issues—economic, environmental, social, and information matters, the safeguarding of security, and so forth. Both would complement each other. Since the world is still far from perfect, and security has not been ensured in the world, these structures should include military organizations and contingents of peacekeeping forces which could be brought into action on the basis of UN decisions or at the request of its regional structures at an early stage of the emergence of possible conflicts, as well as forces designed to help the population and to deliver humanitarian aid during natural disasters, accidents, and catastrophes

It would be expedient to train these (coalition) peacekeeping contingents at special regional training centers under definite programs (some for operations under tropical conditions, others for operations in mountainous terrain or deserts, and so forth) with equipment, command and control, and logistical systems standardized as far as possible and developed under competitive conditions. At the same time, armaments and military hardware intended for national armies (not within the peacekeeping forces) will be developed under state plans and programs, which will ensure their competitiveness.

Depending on its place, role, and geostrategic position in the world, the same country could be a member of one or several regional organizations. In this connection Russia could be a member of the CSCE, the CIS, an organization of Asia-Pacific region states, the Association of Black Sea States, and, of course, the United Nations. And the CIS would have a more specific and clear-cut outline in both form and content.

This, in my view, could mark the establishment of a new order in the world, in which Russia would have the initiative by dint of its worth and prestige, and military force would acquire new, nonideologized guidelines and moral and legal supports.

The strengthening, let alone the expansion of the military bloc would serve to create not a new world order based on a single footing but a new world disorder, since the monopolar system of organizing life has always been unstable. Naturally the NATO bloc is not yet ready to be dismantled, but the idea of gearing it to reform in the foreseeable future and to engaging in peacekeeping missions—perhaps within the CSCE framework—could be shared by many states

Today's politicians must not waste this chance

STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Removal of Nuclear Device in Adit 108-K

944D0042A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 May 94 p 6

[Article by Andrey Vaganov: "The Days of the Nuclear Device in Adit 108-K Are Numbered. But First They Must 'Scare Up' 1 Billion Rubles and Eight Meters of Heavy-Weight Concrete"]

[Text]

Details

"The Russian side will provide for financing and performance of the entire complex of work for dismantling the nuclear device and the material part of the physics experiment FO-100-SZhR in adit 108-k at the Semipalatinsk Testing Ground according to a schedule agreed upon by the parties." So goes the first article of the "Agreement Between the Russian Federation Government and the Republic of Kazakhstan Government for Dismantling the Nuclear Device Placed at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Testing Ground Before It Was Closed," signed in Moscow on 28 March 1994.

Effective 25 October 1990, a year's moratorium was unilaterally introduced on nuclear testing. This step was undertaken by the country's top leaders without serious consultation with members of parliament and specialists. As a result, a nuclear device with a capacity of 0.4 kilotons (equivalent to 400 tonnes of trotyl charge) was left prepared for underground testing in adit 108-k.

The time period of the moratorium had not even expired when on 29 August 1991, Nursultan Nazarbayev, by an order to close the Semipalatinsk Testing Ground, ruled out the possibility of using it further for conducting underground tests. This situation applied fully to the physics experiment OF-100-SRZh that had been prepared at site 108-k.

Thus this nuclear charge, small by today's standards, lay in the adit cut in the granite monolith of Degelen at a depth of 126 meters. Incidentally, the verb "lay" does not quite fit the real state of affairs. Without careful continuous technical service this unintentional unique experiment—never before in world practice has a nuclear charge remained so long, four years, outside warehouse premises—threatened to end with an uncontrollable nuclear explosion at any moment. With the collapse of the USSR the situation at the Semipalatinsk test site, which had become a constituent part of Kazakhstan's national nuclear center, evoked constantly growing alarm. Last winter, as a result of a series of accidents in municipal utility networks, the system for maintaining the normal vital activity of the city of Kurchatov—the capital of the test site, as they called it—was put almost completely out of commission. Consideration was also given to the question of emergency evacuation from it of the Russian military unit that served, among other things, the nuclear charge in adit 108-k (see NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA for 24 November 1993). (Before that 27,000 people had already left the city, mainly military and civilian specialists providing support for nuclear research.)

Work on the present agreement began in the autumn of 1992. But in reality up until the last moment it was not completely certain that it would be signed during President Nazarbayev's official visit to Russia. The fact is that at the end of January 1994 Kazakhstan made a proposal to include in the text an additional article making it incumbent on the Russian side to do "special work to clean up after the activity related to the nuclear device." The Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy would not agree to this proposal and was able to convince the Kazakh side to withdraw it.

Be that as it may, by the end of 1994 the nuclear charge was to have been dismantled and removed from the adit, and all the material part of the experiment was to have been moved unimpeded to the Russian Federal Nuclear Center (All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics—VNIITF) in Chelyabinsk-70. Specialists of the VNIITF in conjunction with the All-Russian Scientific Research and Planning Institute of Industrial Technology carried out the project entitled "Opening and Eliminating Object 108-k."

It is possible to judge the seriousness of the task facing them if only from the fact that as of the first half of 1993 the estimated cost of the work was R650 million. In the opinion of certain of the experts at the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, the real cost would exceed a billion. Incidentally, there is nothing surprising here: After all, adit 108-k is essentially an extremely complex engineering and technical structure. It is 592 meters long. The nuclear device is housed in the so-called end box (KB). The protective shock-absorbing complex, which is actually supposed to guarantee maximum safety when conducting the nuclear explosion, consists of several load-bearing elements: the first section—a concrete ring 49 meters long, and 19.5 meters— from especially heavy-weight concrete with a metal filler; the protective sealing element seven meters in length made of concrete, and several other sealing elements.

The project envisions opening the adit and drilling a bypass. This working should provide access to the end box from the rear side through an eight-meter concrete wall. The opening of concrete protective elements and drilling the bypass were to have been done by the blast-hole drilling method. The concrete wall in the immediate area of the end box was to have been opened with mechanical picks. The overall volume of mining work will amount to about 1,233 cubic meters, and the volume of work for dismantling cable lines and metal elements—about 114 tonnes.

The agreement also envisions a scenario if for one reason or another it is impossible to extract the nuclear device. In this case it is to be destroyed right in the end part of adit 108-k with an applied charge of chemical explosive that will completely preclude the release of nuclear energy.

On 12 April of this year the deputy prime minister of the Russian Government, Oleg Soskovets, signed an order to the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Russian Federal Oversight

of Nuclear and Radiation Safety: "Request that you take measures to implement the agreement."

From NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Files

Since 1961 at the Semipalatinsk Testing Ground 348 underground nuclear explosions have been conducted, of which five were under the program for working on the application of nuclear explosive technologies for industrial purposes. Underground explosions were conducted with nuclear explosive devices placed in both horizontal (215 explosions) and vertical (133 explosions) workings.

British Provide Nuclear Weapon Transport Containers

PM3105085794 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 May 94 p 4

[Viktor Litovkin report: "West Helping Us Get Rid of Surplus Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Jonathan Aitken, Britain's minister for defense procurement, has stated in parliamentary hearings that his country has dispatched to Russia its first consignment of supercontainers for transporting nuclear weapons. This was reported by the British Defence Ministry Information Service.

The consignment consists of 10 of the promised 250 special containers. Moreover, 20 armored trucks will be sent to Russia to transport specific loads such as nuclear warheads. London is helping Moscow to safely transport withdrawn nuclear weapons with a view to accelerating their dismantling and destruction. The British Government has allocated 35 million pounds for this purpose. This was stipulated in a 9 November 1992 bilateral agreement.

The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed the British report. Moreover, it said that we had already received not 10 but 48 supercontainers, which arrived the other day on a British commercial vessel at the port of St. Petersburg. Admittedly, they were not all handed over to the military—six containers are being kept by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, which is the main recipient of such foreign aid in our country.

Apart from the supercontainers and the armored trucks, Britain has promised to supply us with five reserve prime movers. One of them has been being tested on our roads for a year now and, I was told by the military, has proved to be quite a reliable vehicle, able to meet the technical demands made of it.

The people I spoke to at the military department refused to show any photographs of the British equipment or to give its performance. They stated that confidentiality on these matters is a requirement of the joint memorandum and one of the conditions for the safe shipment of nuclear weapons from their bases to the railroad and the recycling plants.

Nonetheless, they said that the supercontainers are outwardly almost indistinguishable from the ordinary 10-cubic-meter containers used for shipments by rail and sea,

and the armored trucks are almost no different from international refrigerated trucks. Except that their off-road capability and engine power are far greater than those of ordinary vehicles, and the armored cab is capable of protecting the nuclear weapon from bullets and grenade fragments in possible acts of terrorism or sabotage. The supercontainers are also protected against fire. Even if a major fire is raging around them, the air around the warhead does not reach a critical temperature.

Apart from Britain, the United States, Germany, and France are also giving us help in getting rid of our surplus nuclear weapons, and an accord exists with Italy—an agreement has been signed but has not yet come into force.

The U.S. Government has allocated \$400 million for these purposes. The German leadership contributed 10 million German marks [DM] last year for Russia to ensure the safe shipment and temporary storage of nuclear weapons and to draw up plans for processing and recycling weapons-grade plutonium and uranium. This year it has provided another DM9 million, some of which will go to Ukraine.

But, the military told me, not a single cent, penny, or pfennig has crossed the CIS borders. All the money is still in the United States, Britain, France, and Germany. Naturally so. In helping Russia and the other former Union republics that still have nuclear weapons on their territory to get rid of their surpluses, Western governments are at the same time securing major orders for their own firms and providing work for their own plants.

Of course, the people I spoke to said, we could get by without their help, but then it would take many a long year to get rid of the nuclear weapon overhang.

Whereas previously we would transport up to 20 nuclear weapons a year with many natural precautions and in conditions of heightened secrecy, now, for instance, more than 2,000 such warheads have to be withdrawn from Ukraine in the space of three or four years. In the two months since they began to be evacuated, 180 warheads have already been withdrawn on three trains. This is not only very labor-intensive work but is also very costly.

Incidentally, foreign aid has not yet been used for these shipments, while the cars intended for the nuclear weapons have been in service for 15-20 years already, new cars have not been built for years, the track on which they will run has also not been repaired for a long time, and if it were not for Western aid it is not clear where all the funds would come from. The military budget could not afford it.

At the same time, my interlocutors stated that Western aid accounts for just a few percent of the total volume of work that is being done and will have to be done by Russia itself and its military and civilian specialists. Back in 1991 a special 20-year federal program was drawn up for enhancing the security of nuclear weapons, recycling surplus weapons, and burying the fissionable material. It required expenditure of 240 billion rubles in 1991 prices.

Today the figure would be quite different. Perhaps this is why the program has still not been ratified by the Russian Government, although it has not been rejected.

GROUND TROOPS

'Smelchak' Artillery System

94UM0439A Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE* in English No 1-2, 1994 p C3

[Text] System of adjusting artillery weapon with laser guidance for 240-mm mortars is intended for damage of armoured vehicles, launchers and artillery systems, control and communication points, defensive installations, bridges, crossings.

Set	
240-mm towed mortar M-240	
Round 3VF4 with 240-mm adjusting high explosive mine 3F5	
Laser range finder 1D15	
Means of synchronization 1A35K, 1A35I	
Means of radio communication R107M (R108M)	

Main operational and technical characteristics

Range of fire, km	3.6-9.2
Range of laser target indication, km	0.2-5.0
Mines expenditure for target damage, pieces	1-3
Time of homing guidance, s	0.2-3.0

Delivery set

240-mm towed mortar M-240, pieces	2
Round 3VF4 with 240-mm adjusting high explosive mine 3F5, pieces	200
Laser range finder 1D15, pieces	1
Synchronizer unit 1A35K + 1A35I, pieces	1
Radio station R107M (R108M), pieces	3
Field telephone TA-57 with cable P-247M, pieces	6
Training set:	
training mock-up 3PU34, pieces	3
training station 9F647 "Sizyak", pieces	1
240-mm training round VF864A, pieces	20

For the additional information, with proposals you can address: 117342, Moscow, Vvedensky str., 3, "AMETEX". Phone: (095) 285-56-36. Fax: (095) 923-57-93 "AMETEX"

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NAVAL FORCES

Kravchuk Position on Division of Bases

94UM0418B Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian 26 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Anatoliy Polyakov: "Leonid Kravchuk Agrees to a Russian Naval Base in Sevastopol"]

[Text] The Ukrainian mass media are actively discussing the negotiation results, or more accurately the absence thereof, following the meeting between the military delegations of

Russia and Ukraine. Many emphasize that the positions of the president and the military department of Ukraine are at opposite poles.

On Sunday, Leonid Kravchuk said on television that the various statements made by Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetsky do not represent the position of the government of Ukraine.

"I support the realities that have evolved in Crimea," he noted. "A Russian naval base may be created in Sevastopol, and Russian ships should be stationed in Kerch, Feodosiya, Balaklava and other ports on the basis of supplementary agreements."

Leonid Kravchuk stressed that he never said that the USA or any other third party needed to participate in the negotiations. The meeting of the defense ministers was not a culminating point, but only part of the search for the final results. In Kravchuk's words, he exchanged opinions with Viktor Chernomyrdin, and they came to the conclusion that a meeting at the level of the presidents of Russia and Ukraine was needed in order to solve the Black Sea Fleet problem.

Judging from everything, Leonid Kravchuk does not yet share the same opinion regarding the future of the Russian fleet in Crimea held by Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetsky, as was also true earlier of ex-Minister Konstantin Morozov. Moreover, it might be more proper to say that their views on its fate are diametrically opposite. Whether they find a common language, or another leader of the Ukrainian military department will have to be retired, only the immediate future will tell.

Nor did Leonid Kravchuk leave unattended the statements by Yuriy Meshkov concerning secession of Crimea, calling them ill-conceived. He emphasized that all Crimean edicts conflicting with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine will be nullified in the future as well, except of course those pertaining to economic reforms in Crimea.

Grachev's Position in Black Sea Fleet Talks

94UM0418A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian 26 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Maryukha: "It's Easy To Divide Ships on Paper. It's Harder To Observe the Interests of the Sides"]

[Text] An abundance of the most acute problems—political, economic, diplomatic, purely military, and even moral—have come together in the Black Sea Fleet like a tight sailor's knot. Unless we solve them, we could hardly hope to emerge from the 'Black Sea dead-end' and relieve the tension under which Black Sea seamen are living and serving today," stated General of the Army Pavel Grachev, the Russian defense minister, at a Ministry of Defense press conference. Therefore, even despite the considerable concessions by the Russian delegation, and its patience with the excessive demands of the Ukrainian side, which sometimes went contrary to agreements reached previously, the first round of talks on dividing the Black Sea Fleet was unable to put an end to the protracted litigation: The military were unable to draft and initial a treaty that the presidents have already

agreed upon. They weren't even able to sign a protocol on nonagreement of the parties, which naturally follows in such a case. Still, it cannot be said that the negotiations have broken down, or have reached an insurmountable impasse.

The Russian Federation defense minister gave a large number of examples leading to the conclusion that the position of the Ukrainian side at the talks in Sevastopol was in diametric opposition to statements and announcements of the Ukrainian president. In particular, an item concerning joint basing of the Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy in Sevastopol, an item concerning "corridors" for the passage of Russian Black Sea ships to their bases that is discriminatory from the standpoint of international law of the sea, and a demand that the ships and vessels of the fleet be "transferred to the sides" fully manned (as if some third party is giving the Black Sea Fleet to Russia and Ukraine) were introduced into the document drafted by the Ukrainian side. Where all of this comes from, emphasized General of the Army Pavel Grachev, is from the fact that first of all the Ukrainian side does not wish to operate with universally recognized legal terms, and secondly, local executors are trying to interpret the Agreement on Stage-by-Stage Settlement of the Problems of the Black Sea Fleet, signed on 15 April in Moscow, to their own advantage.

The act of dividing the ships, regarding which the negotiators did manage to reach agreement, having included all watercraft on the lists with accuracy "down to the sloop," was termed by Pavel Grachev as only the first stage of division. Division of the Black Sea Fleet is a lengthy process that will not fit within the framework of the current year, nor possibly even the next, 1995.

But the main thing is this: We first need to resolve the matter of separate basing of the Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy. "We did not demand removal ships of the Ukrainian Navy from Crimea," Pavel Grachev stressed, "the ships could be based together, including at the five bases that we propose leaving for the Black Sea Fleet. But the headquarters must be separated. Where the headquarters of the Ukrainian Navy are to be located is a matter for Ukraine to resolve, but Sevastopol must remain the main base of the Black Sea Fleet."

The search for consensus on this most important item of the 15 April agreement went on until the very last minute, emphasized special ambassador Yuriy Dubinin, who participated in the press conference. And while the fact that it was not reached is worthy of sympathy, it doesn't warrant a dramatic outburst. The documents signed by the presidents of Russia and Ukraine were drafted in such a way that there is nothing in them left for interpretation at the level of the executors. They need to be fulfilled or not fulfilled. From all appearances, the Ukrainian delegation took the path of nonfulfillment, which predetermined the outcome of the meeting in Sevastopol.

There simply cannot be a third party to the process of settling the Black Sea problems—this is a matter exclusively for Russia and Ukraine. This was categorically stated by participants of the press conference at the Russian Ministry of Defense. There is a way out of the "Black Sea dead-end"

even in the absence of interference from without. We need to continue the negotiation process. However, we need to begin the second round not with debates but with an effort to agree on terms and on the subject of discussion. In the words of Pavel Grachev, it would be suitable to create state commissions under the leadership of the prime ministers or their first deputies in preparation for the next such meeting, and include representatives of all interested ministries and departments in their membership so as to determine exactly how much is owed to whom. Otherwise, the discussion would simply continue "with raised voices."

However, Yuriy Dubinin stated during the press conference that there are grounds for believing that the problems of the Black Sea Fleet will be resolved peacefully, and in the interests of the peoples of Russia and Ukraine. As the special ambassador explained, it was agreed that Russian President Boris Yeltsin will make a visit to Ukraine, during which a major treaty between the two states is to be signed. This could bring the process of unraveling the Black Sea knot to its conclusion, so long as the aides to President Leonid Kravchuk do not let down their leader, as they have done before, in fulfilling Ukraine's international obligations.

Black Sea Settlement Dependent on Ukrainian Domestic Politics

*PM3005110994 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 May 94 p 2*

[Commentary under the "Theme of the Week" rubric by observer Aleksandr Golts: "The Moscow-Kiev-Simferopol Triangle Could Become a Bermuda Triangle. For the Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text] If Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, were alive today he would surely have written a book about slips of the tongue by politicians, their press secretaries, and journalists who write about politics. Because these slips of the tongue demonstrate in a very curious way a connection which exists between problems in the subconscious of all those people but which, aloud, is flatly denied. The recent Russo-Ukrainian talks are a prime example of that.

Let me remind you that initially it was stated that the meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian heads of government would be dedicated to the situation in the Crimea, which has deteriorated. However, it emerged that this was a slip of the tongue. The two countries' delegations concentrated not on the confrontation between the authorities in Kiev and the Crimea but on the division of the Black Sea Fleet. As far as I am aware, no one at an official level has made a direct link between the problems of the fleet and mutual relations between Kiev and Simferopol, which deteriorate periodically. But this slip of the tongue makes you wonder. At the very least it sheds light on why it has proved impossible for so long to reach final agreement on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet.

A miracle has not happened now either. The Russo-Ukrainian talks have become bogged down again. Once again on the problem of the basing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy. Let us be frank here: Even

though the technical details of the forthcoming division are highly complex, that is not the essential matter. The nub of the problem is the political will of the contracting parties or rather the lack of it on the part of one of them. The fate of the Black Sea Fleet at the end of the 20th century is paradoxically reminiscent of the fate of Poland at the end of the 18th century. Two hundred years ago that country was also being constantly partitioned. The slightest fluctuation in the balance of relations between the major European powers aroused in them an irresistible desire to engage in a trial of strength with one another by embarking on yet another partition of Poland.

The paradox of the Black Sea Fleet is that the initiator of each new attempt to divide it up is the country in the weaker position, namely, Ukraine. A debtor forced to settle its account with Russia using its most valuable assets—its oil and gas reserves—finds consolation for its complexes in a petty squabble over a legacy which will not bring Ukraine either economic or military-political advantage. The question here is not so much one of Russo-Ukrainian relations as of the internal political struggle in Ukraine.

In Kiev they forgot long ago, if they ever knew at all, that the fleet was designed to safeguard the security of the state. Just as they seem to have forgotten that it is dangerous to turn the nuclear missiles stationed on Ukrainian territory into a bargaining counter. But how else can you explain the fact that whenever the situation in the Crimea heats up, politicians close to the Ukrainian president suddenly begin alluding to the possibility of Kiev's withdrawal from its international commitments on these weapons. And this causes considerable unease in the world.

The whole point of this is that in the minds of the Ukrainian politicians the fleet is first and foremost a symbol. Not just of a naval presence but also of the right to Sevastopol. A city which was created and which exists primarily as a naval base. But Sevastopol, in the minds of many people in Ukraine, is the key to the Crimea, which is so determinedly trying to break free from Ukraine's embraces. But whenever the talk turns to the symbols that are used in the political struggle, all rational discussion becomes impossible.

That is because whenever attempts have been made to reach agreement on the Black Sea Fleet, Ukrainian politicians on returning to Kiev began interpreting those accords in such a way that they effectively rendered them meaningless. The solution to these riddles is simple. The Ukrainian president understands perfectly well that if he concludes a more or less reasonable agreement (which, in any event, will be a compromise) his political opponents will not be slow to accuse him of betraying the national interests. The fact that it proved impossible to demonstrate even a semblance of agreement during the present talks is evidence that on the eve of the presidential elections Kiev is bound hand and foot.

Meanwhile, REUTER reports from Kiev that a Ukrainian Government representative, who asked to remain nameless, has stated that Ukraine "is going to ask the UN Security Council to examine the question of the unlawful stationing

of foreign troops on its territory and demand their complete withdrawal." "We mean the Black Sea Fleet, of course," that representative stated.

The matter is further complicated by the fact that, by all accounts, it is in Ukraine, not Russia, as many people feared, that the military are beginning to play an autonomous political role. The attempts at strong-arm actions against the Black Sea Fleet followed by threatening statements from Ukrainian Defense Ministry spokesmen—all these things are in conflict with President Kravchuk's official line.

It must also be said honestly that despite its partner's constantly improper conduct, Moscow is quite limited in the ways that it can exert pressure. Suggestions about "switching off" the oil and gas supply in retaliation should be regarded as an emotional response. After all, a sharp worsening of the domestic political situation in Ukraine and an increased threat of the disintegration of Ukraine are certainly not in Russia's interests. The balanced stance adopted by Moscow during the present crisis in the Crimea confirms that. Incidentally, it is obvious that by no means everyone in Simferopol realizes that the "war of nerves" that nearly began accompanied by overtly provocative rumors about "tank columns" heading toward Sevastopol could have extremely regrettable consequences.

By all accounts Russia is going to have to negotiate patiently and consistently without letting itself be sidetracked either by Kiev's improvisations or the appeals of extremists, and such people exist in the Crimea, too. It remains to be hoped that those people who would like to turn the fleet into a pawn in a political game will remember that we are talking here about a major naval grouping equipped with the most modern weapons. After all, during the incident in Odessa the bolts of the Kalashnikovs were already being released.... Let us hope that in the event of further confrontation the Moscow-Kiev-Simferopol triangle (where only Moscow is demonstrating a balanced approach) does not become a Bermuda Triangle for the Black Sea Fleet.

Pacific Fleet Commander's Dismissal Called 'Unfair'
PM0106090194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 May 94 p 5

[Boris Reznik report: "Explosion After Explosion. Pacific Fleet Protests Against Its Commander's Dismissal"]

[Text] Maritime Kray—This is the second week running that there has been a sound of firing amid a range of hills near the Maritime Kray village of Novonezhino, where the Pacific Fleet Air Force arsenal is located. The sound is made by engineers collecting and destroying the missiles, bombs, mortars, and shells that were dispersed in the wake of the 14 May explosion.... Things are worryingly deserted for many kilometers all around—there are deserted houses with broken windows, militia cordons....

In Defense of the Admiral

At the same time, the Pacific Fleet is being rocked by other explosions covering ships, combined units, and ground, air

force, and hydrographical services over a huge area—explosions of protest against the dismissal of Admiral Georgiy Gurinov, commander of the Pacific Fleet. Telegrams and letters are being sent to Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev from officers' collectives appealing for the decision to remove their commander to be reviewed. This is a hitherto unheard-of phenomenon in military circles. Petitions have been fearlessly signed by all 142 of the Fleet's admirals and staff officers, officers' assemblies at the Admiral Makarov Naval College, and around 3,500 officers, ensigns, and sailors in the nuclear submarine fleet.... Veterans from the Pacific Fleet and the city of Vladivostok have come to the commander's support, along with the Council of Soldiers' and Sailors' Mothers....

Grachev's telegram to the Pacific Fleet stated that Adm. Gurinov had been dismissed for "...serious shortcomings in his organizational activity relating to leadership of the Fleet." The accusation was formulated in the relatively classic way—it can be used to remove any commander, including a flag officer. And at any time, if we proceed on the Dostoyevskiy basis that "...absolutely anyone can be blamed for anything." Just how far does Gurinov's guilt square with this very severe punishment? Why have Pacific Fleet sailors been taking a moral stand in defending their senior admiral en masse—going against the unwritten list of bans that prevents people speaking up for their commander before his superiors?

In order to understand this, we need to compare the situation in the Pacific Fleet a year ago, before Gurinov arrived, with the way things are now.

Difficult Inheritance

Last May, when IZVESTIYA was introducing Adm. Gurinov to readers as the Pacific Fleet Commander, we noted that he was inheriting a lot of naval problems. We need only recall the monstrous neglect and complete chaos at the Fleet's training schools on Russkiy Island, where four sailors died of starvation, cold, maltreatment, and illness. The then command was very much involved in commerce. Pacific Fleet auxiliaries suddenly turned up off foreign shores in the hands of very dubious firms. The Fleet was constantly rocked by accidents and people would be killed. The combat training indicators were very low....

The Pacific Fleet is the kind of cumbersome organization that takes years to get to know and get to grips with its problems. Gurinov managed to change a lot in one year. This is not my opinion—it is the view of prestigious military and naval specialists (around 100 of them) who, on the instructions of the Defense Ministry and the Naval High Command, recently carried out comprehensive checks of all the local services and combined units. Speaking at the time at a press conference on the results of the checks, Igor Kasatonov, Deputy Commander in Chief of the Navy, made a high assessment of the Fleet's combat readiness, had some warm words to say about its commander, and referred approvingly to the morale climate in combined and other units....

Military matters are a subtle area—they are not something you discuss with "all and sundry." But here is, for us, an important and accurate piece of information—under Adm. Gurinov's command the Pacific Fleet significantly improved all the main objective indicators of its activity (its operational-tactical and headquarters training), strengthened military discipline, reduced its accident rate.... Ships that had been languishing offshore finally put to sea, and the combat training plan was completely fulfilled.

We would note that the current command is steering the Fleet through the turbulent maelstroms and deadly shoals of our common life—which is by no means improving. We should ponder on the fact that since the start of the year the Pacific Fleet has not been allocated even 25 percent of the minimum amount of appropriations it had requested. There is not even enough money to pay wages. There are no funds to deliver provisions and fuel to remote Fleet centers scattered around the coastline and islands. Ships return from combat standby duty and the crews should be sent on leave, but it is impossible—there is no money to buy tickets from Aeroflot. Housing construction for officers has virtually ground to a halt—in May, for instance, only 350 million rubles [R] of the R18.5 billion required for these purposes were allocated....

Despite these and many other circumstances beyond its control, the Pacific Fleet is, to use military language, "fulfilling its mission" and carrying out its difficult job, which has now lost all its romance.

So what exactly happened between April and early May to make Pavel Grachev suddenly describe the Pacific Fleet as the worst in the Armed Forces and call its commander unsuitable? That is a puzzle not only to the men of the Pacific Fleet. Why, they ask, are some people keeping their commands when performance and morale are plummeting, while others lose their jobs at a time when, despite everything, they have the situation "under control"?

Since not the slightest attempt was made to offer a reason for the Pacific Fleet commander's removal, this gave rise to a lot of assumptions. The usual intrigues—including military intrigues—are suspected in Moscow's corridors of power. But more often people say that the reason for the admiral's dismissal is connected with the explosions at the Novonezhino arsenals.

Special Danger Zone

Every morning I turn on the radio in suspense to hear what has blown up where. If there is no such report, I breathe easier—we have gotten away with it. But in general, there are so many accidents, particularly here in the Far East, that it sometimes seems as though they are being churned out by some diabolical factory with a view to depriving us of our spiritual peace. It would be better not to know what kind of dangerous stuff is hidden away from view in the harmless-sounding "prohibited areas" that are scattered across all parts of the Far East, even to be found in cities shaded by nearby woods. About a year ago a retired military man who had "nothing to lose"—since he was emigrating that very day to live in one of our nearest-neighbor countries—came into the IZVESTIYA correspondents' center and said that

there was a chemical weapons arsenal in Khabarovsk behind a green-shaded corner as you turn toward the Krasnaya stream. One faulty bomb is all it would take to do away with this city of 700,000.

We who live here would like to know how reliably these most dangerous weapons are guarded and by whom. But unfortunately, when we are talking about arms, particularly of such a dangerous type, social forces become socially impotent. We find ourselves in servile dependence on Defense Ministry generals and we are forced to reassure ourselves with the mantra: "They have a clearer picture." Admittedly, in this instance the people of Khabarovsk can be reassured: In preparing this article, I phoned Lieutenant General Valeriy Samsonov, chief of staff of the Far East Military District, who told me that the chemical weapons arsenal had been removed from Khabarovsk. But how many other arsenals are left?

The military told me that, when the thousands of tonnes of bombs went off at Novonezhino, they prayed that the missile fuel dumps nearby would not go up by accident or (it does not bear thinking about!) some smoldering rocket would not fly off to Bolshoy Kamen and hit a submarine with a nuclear reactor. As is now clear, the sheer chance that the explosions in Vladivostok and Novonezhino happened on the same day—14 May—two years apart is seen by many people as neatly preordained, and even the possibility of sabotage is not being ruled out. Our usual lack of organization has been evident in our investigation into the cause of this latest disaster. But more of this later; for now we will try to see how many weapons and munitions have been amassed in the Pacific Fleet alone, who guards them, and in what way.

I have obtained the document—a submission from the Military Prosecutor's Office—"On Eradicating Violations of Legislation on the Storage of Weapons, Ammunition, and Explosives." This is the fruit of a two-month (February-March last year) investigation into the Pacific Fleet's arsenals carried out not only by prosecution personnel but also by specialists from the Navy High Command's Missile and Artillery Armaments Directorate. Here are some selected extracts from the document:

"...The bulk of the arms checked do not accord with the requirements of the guidance document on ensuring the safekeeping of weapons and ammunition. The premises in which they are stored are not made of reinforced concrete or of brick with reinforced concrete roofs and floors. Many dumps are too full and the ammunition is not stacked safely. Appropriations for the construction of new dumps are not being allocated. Not a single paragraph of the long-term plan for the construction of technical security facilities in 1991-1995 has been carried out. As a result, most of the installations checked have homemade alarm systems which cannot provide reliable security. Almost half of the wooden boxes in which the weapons and ammunition are stored are unsuitable, stacks of shells of different calibers have collapsed, shells are scattered around and many of them are rusty, yet they are not being written off or destroyed...."

We would note in passing that these outrages were happening before Adm. Gurinov even arrived to command the Fleet, so that according to normal logic he should not be held responsible for them. As a rule, the arsenals were replenished irrespective of the real needs of the Pacific Fleet or of what its commanders wanted. There are plenty of examples of this, but we will take the most immediate—the Novonezhino arsenal. Rear Admiral German Ugryumov, Pacific Fleet chief of military counterintelligence, told me that at the time of the explosion around 2,000 standard carloads of aviation ammunition of various yields and calibers had built up there—almost three times more than the potential storage norm. A considerable proportion of this dangerous cargo was dispatched here, on the orders of the Defense Ministry leadership, from...the Baltic. Maybe the shores of the Pacific were in particular need of bombs, missiles, and shells that were superfluous to the Baltic? It turns out that they were transported across the entire country so as to be...destroyed here. It is ideas like that, not a lack of ideas, that constitute real stupidity.

Ammunition to be recycled accounted for more than 70 percent of what was stored in the Novonezhino dumps. How much is at other dumps? This is a big secret, but people in the know have told me that Defense Ministry officials have long regarded the Russian Far East as a huge dump for radioactive material and explosives. The local authorities are stubbornly trying to ensure the adoption of a national program for the destruction of unnecessary armaments. The government assures us that there are no funds available at the moment, while...throwing away much bigger sums on endlessly "overcoming obstacles." For instance, Svetlana Parinov, chairman of the Maritime Kray Economics and Planning Committee, reported that the Novonezhino explosion would cost the treasury at least R31 billion. This amount does not include the losses suffered by the Fleet. Add to this the colossal expenditure on the clear-up operations after the explosions at the Vladivostok arsenal two years ago and innumerable "trivial" accidents of which Russian readers are no longer informed because they are considered so routine....

Who has worked out how much money will be needed to guard and maintain "dead"—decommissioned—nuclear submarines? Their missile launchers are removed, but their nuclear reactors remain in place. These need to be constantly monitored by highly skilled specialists in order to prevent a disaster. These craft have been waiting to be recycled for years, and they are being joined by new submarines all the time.... Their crews, disbanded on paper, have been forced to continue their now simply stupid, although extremely responsible service.

If such fabulous expenditure is to be avoided, the government should clearly come up with the funds to set up facilities to destroy unnecessary arms. But clearly we should start by organizing reliable security at the arsenals. The way this is currently organized is graphically visible from the same prosecution submission:

"...Weapons and ammunition dumps in the Pacific Fleet are mainly guarded by squads of paramilitary security force riflemen which, owing to their low pay, are not fully staffed

and experience considerable manpower turnover. Absences without leave and drunkenness are widespread among the security staff...."

Now let us imagine the old men and women compelled out of great necessity (who would agree to guard weapons dumps far from home, without any uniforms or normal food, for a miserable salary?) to guard things on which not only human life but the continued presence on the map of entire cities depends. And this is happening at a time when criminal structures are doing everything to get their hands on weapons.

The Boys Wanted a Little Silver...

Let us return to the Novonezhino explosion. It is now clear that it was not the result of an agricultural fire, as all the press had initially reported. The accident was caused by two sailors from the arsenal's security subunit. The motives and circumstances of the incident were set out in such a contradictory way by the newspapers that I turned for the most accurate information to Boris Larichev, Pacific Fleet deputy military prosecutor, who is conducting the criminal case. Here is what he said:

"That day Seamen D. and A. were not on patrol. D. had heard that aircraft missile battery units contained silver, and, after he had whispered the information to his comrades, they infiltrated the dump. They found the missile stacks and, not knowing where the battery units were located, started unscrewing something with a bayonet. This turned out to be a tracking flare—it ignites when the missile is fired and burns for around 20-25 seconds. Ignition can be triggered by friction or a blow, which is what happened—D.'s blade cut through the foil covering the tracking flare and it ignited right in D.'s hand. The sailor was burned, and then the whole rack caught fire. The guys were scared, ran to the guardhouse, and then took cover with the entire guard behind some mounds...."

This is what the Fleet got from these stupid young men who had reinforced their untoward tendencies at vocational and technical college. Now they face Article 251 "footnote" of the Russian Federation Criminal Code—"violation of the regulations governing the handling of weapons and items and substances posing a heightened danger to those in the vicinity...." This article provides for terms of imprisonment ranging from three to 15 years. The courts will probably consider the fact that, thank God, nobody died during the explosions to be an extenuating circumstance. This time we got away with it.

Now let us enquire just what sort of order reigns in that security detachment if the sailors could "fumble about" in the arsenal entirely unmolested. The fact is that there was hardly any security provided at all for a huge number of terrible weapons. There were only 16 guards on duty instead of the 64 there should have been. No observation was being carried out from guard towers and no checks were being done at checkpoints. Contrary to regulations, these measures were replaced by patrols of sailors armed only with bayonets around the four-km perimeter of the arsenal. Yet it was storing not just aviation ammunition but various small arms, which are so attractive to the criminal world and those

connected with it. Here at the Novonezhino dumps forged documents had recently been used to steal 41 Kalashnikov assault rifles, 31 Makarov pistols, 140 grenades, and over 20,000 rounds.... The crime was committed with the participation of Major Votinov, former chief of the arsenal, and other officers and staff from law-enforcement organs. These weapons are now being confiscated from the mafia and hired killers....

The Fleet and the people of the Far East know that Gurinov had begun to seriously restore order at Pacific Fleet arsenals. He issued a stern order to shoot to kill anyone who attempted to infiltrate military arms dumps. The decision to dismiss him leaves people confused and bitter.

Voronin of Defense Industry Committee Argues Case for Aircraft Carriers

PM0306144094 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jun 94 p 3

[Interview with Academician Gennadiy Voronin, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee for the Defense Industry, by Igor Chernyak; date, place not given: "Instead of Aircraft Carriers—Peter the Great's Boats. Academician Gennadiy Voronin, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee for the Defense Industry, on the Approaching Demise of the Russian Navy"]

[Text] [Chernyak] Gennadiy Petrovich, what prompted you to contact the paper?

[Voronin] The dire state of the Russian Navy on the threshold of its 300th anniversary. Battleworthy ships are leaving the Russian Federation Navy in droves—the Soviet Navy never experienced losses of this kind in its entire history, either in peacetime or even in wartime. Aircraft carrier losses are particularly serious. Of the five aircraft-carrying cruisers which were recently built and which are not even halfway through their scheduled lifetime, only two now remain. Moreover, the fate of one of them is predetermined.

The warship building program between now and the year 2003 does not provide for the construction of any aircraft carriers. Moreover, the scientific and industrial projects on aircraft carrier construction are no longer functioning and they could begin to be irrevocably destroyed in the very near future. Unless urgent measures are adopted, it will take us decades to reach the level we were at in the late eighties and early nineties.

[Chernyak] But the West can still afford to build aircraft carriers—it has lots of money. It is too expensive for Russia....

[Voronin] It has been the popular view in recent years: Aircraft-carrying ships are allegedly not necessary, because they are "expensive," "ineffective," and "aggressive." But, as a rule, these "justifications" are not confirmed by the calculations. Evidently, their authors believe that bald pronouncements, with an apparent military-analytical flavor, are enough for the general public. I will tell you that the first

aircraft-carrying cruiser, the Kiev, which we built in 1970-1975, cost the country less than 270 million rubles [R] at 1975 prices, and counting the aircraft complement—R320 million. The heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov, with its complement of ultramodern fighters, cost no more than R850-990 million at 1990 prices. Compare that with the cost of a Nimitz-class U.S. Navy aircraft carrier—\$3.038 billion. At the same time, the inclusion of heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers in naval groupings makes them 1.5-2 times more effective. In other words, the effective strength of fleets has to be doubled in order to achieve the same results without heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers. If one is talking about the value of the naval forces and various onshore facilities remaining intact in the first two-three weeks of conventional combat actions, it would far exceed the amount spent on the creation and upkeep of aircraft carriers.

[Chernyak] But there is an "alternative" path—deployment of shore-based fighter aircraft in addition to those in the air defense system....

[Voronin] It would only be partial cover: The range of shore-based aircraft and the amount of time they can spend in areas where our naval forces require cover is limited, since mankind has yet to invent an aircraft that can continue flying indefinitely and has not raised a generation of pilots capable of being at the controls for days on end. Indeed, what is needed is further supplies of aircraft and the creation, often in remote areas, of basing systems and all types of support and maintenance for newly formed aircraft units (at least 15 fighter regiments per fleet). So expenditure on the implementation of this alternative would not compare (we are talking about tens of times as much) with expenditure on the creation of heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers.

[Chernyak] What about the aggressive nature of aircraft carriers—after all, what we have is a defensive doctrine...

[Voronin] But the Soviet doctrine never envisaged waging combat actions in theaters overseas. Therefore, the idea of creating attack aircraft carriers was not developed here. Our Navy's aircraft-carrying ships have always been built as the main means of protecting their forces and facilities and this construction has always been for defensive purposes.

[Chernyak] Whom do you intend to defend yourself against—indeed, according to the military doctrine, Russia has no enemies.

[Voronin] Let us look at the military doctrines and tasks facing the Western countries' navies. The U.S. military doctrine is based on such tenets as, for example, "U.S. world hegemony is to be achieved" and "the main opponent is the CIS and Third World countries." Hence the maritime strategy whereby the U.S. Navy must be capable of posing a nuclear missile threat along the perimeter of the CIS countries, destroying CIS and Third World countries' armed forces groupings in their entire operational depth, blockading the CIS Navy off its own coast, and preventing it from deploying on ocean routes.

[Chernyak] But the United States now has a new maritime strategy....

[Voronin] It does not identify a new opponent, but assumes that the United States now has undoubted supremacy at sea, based on an assessment of the state of the Russian Navy. The concept of fighting the Navy of the former USSR on the ocean is replaced by the concept of using the U.S. Navy in maritime areas adjoining our coast and waging combat actions in conjunction with the Army and Air Force in order to gain supremacy on dry land.

So we, Russia, remain the chief opponent. You can judge for yourselves whether we need aircraft carriers when our new "partners" have that kind of doctrine. Not to mention the fact that the U.S., British, and French Navies have aircraft carriers with offensive weapons—attack aircraft.

[Chernyak] What is the situation in the United States regarding aircraft carriers?

[Voronin] They are continuing to build mighty ships such as Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. They are large-displacement (90,000-100,000 tonnes) ships, carrying some 90 aircraft. Their main purpose is to deal heavy blows to enemy territory and armed forces, using their aircraft. Special escort forces have been set up to support aircraft carriers' combat activities, because they are used in carrier battle groups or multipurpose carrier groups—8-10 cruisers and destroyers per carrier. There are 15 of these groups in the U.S. Navy. This number will diminish somewhat by 2000, but there will then be eight nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and construction is planned to continue. Moreover, the Americans are not scrapping the aircraft carriers they withdraw from combat service, but they are transferring them to the reserve, keeping around 60 percent of the maintenance personnel (for example, the aircraft carrier Lexington, withdrawn from combat service in 1991, and the Midway, withdrawn in 1992, are being held in reserve and have not been sent for scrap).

We know also that a blueprint has been drawn up for future aircraft-carrying ships in Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal, where ships of limited displacement of between 8,000 and 20,000 tonnes are planned (in Spain one has been built). Even a small country like Thailand has ordered a Principe de Asturias-class aircraft-carrying ship from Spain....

[Chernyak] What are you proposing?

[Voronin] We do not consider it possible today, indeed we are incapable of building aircraft carriers like the Admiral Kuznetsov—it is very expensive and, in fact, the main base is now in Ukraine. But in order to ensure that the Russian Federation Navy does not lose the potential to provide air cover for its forces at sea, it would be entirely acceptable to decide to build small aircraft carriers of comparatively small displacement (12,000-15,000 tonnes). We have the potential to do this at the moment—the specialists, designers, and shipbuilding capacities are still available. We could even make them for sale abroad—more and more countries, including Third World countries, are showing an interest in ships of this class. All this would considerably facilitate the

task of equipping our Navy with aircraft carriers, if only three or four per fleet, primarily for the Northern and Pacific Fleets.

[Chernyak] Not a bad idea : It would be no worse than the arms race in terms of ruining us....

[Voronin] It is not a matter of building 10 aircraft carriers quickly. We favor a methodical, deliberate, and consistent continuation (without stopping and starting) of the construction of aircraft-carrying cruisers, but at Russian shipyards. Personally, I think it is time to immediately launch a state order for the planning of small aircraft-carrying ships: It would enable us to retain the development collective and start preparing for the construction of a series of aircraft carriers in St. Petersburg and Severodvinsk, with an export version in mind (countries with nonglobal economies would be able to afford them). It must be borne in mind that only three or four countries would be able to afford to develop aircraft-carrying ships of this class. But if we waste time, even according to the authors of "Jane's Fighting Ships 1993-1994," "there is a danger of the drift or even collapse of the whole Russian shipbuilding industry."

I think it would be advisable also for the Russian Federation Defense Ministry to review the way it thinks about the Navy.

Varyag, Kiev To Be Scrapped

LD0306172894 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1618 GMT 3 Jun 94

[By *ITAR-TASS* special correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Sevastopol June 3 TASS—The Varyag aircraft-carrying cruiser, whose construction was begun in 1987 in Nikolayev and suspended three years ago, will be scrapped on decision of the Ukrainian authorities. The metal will be sold abroad.

The cruiser of over 60,000 tonnes displacement is 340 meters long and 76 meters wide. Russia has several ships of the type, including Kiev, Novorossiisk and Minsk.

Kiev has scrapped the almost-built Ulyanov aircraft-carrier, and sold its metal abroad dirt cheap. Deputy Black Sea Fleet Commander for Operation and Repairs Rear-Admiral Aleksandr Aladkin told *ITAR-TASS* today. The same will be done to the ships to be received by Kiev as result of the Black Sea Fleet division.

The Admiral is skeptical about Ukrainian claims the republic is a major ship-building state. In his words, all the eight ship-building plants of the republic depend on the delivery of accessories. "It is half the work to build a ship's hull. It should be equipped and armed, and Ukraine cannot do this on its own," said Aladkin.

The Nikolayev plant has almost finalized the construction of the Admiral Lobov cruiser. But they will still have to buy an air-defence system which is produced in Russia and costs 65 billion rubles, he added.

Aladkin is sure that the Black Sea Fleet should be divided as soon as possible, as this is the only way "to make sure that Ukraine is unable to maintain even a small part of the fleet".

'Okean-SP' Coastal Radar Tracks Shipping Movements Off Baltiysk

PM0606101594 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*
in Russian 2 Jun 94 p 2

[Valeriy Gromak report: "Okean Changes Profession"]

[Text] Baltiysk—The problem of ensuring the safety of warship and civilian vessel movement has always existed for Baltiysk. Today, considerably more Kaliningrad-bound foreign ships have started passing through the main base of the Baltic Fleet, which has made the problem of ensuring safety even more complex. The Russian Maritime Transportation Department has recently certified the fact of the creation in Baltiysk of the oblast's first coastal system of shipping movements. Its base is the "Okean-SP" coastal radar complex which can automatically track 55 targets at once.

Exercise Rehearses Handling of Naval Battle Casualties

PM0306150194 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*
in Russian 3 Jun 94 p 1

[Lieutenant Sergey Voyeykov and Major Oleg Pochinyuk report: "Medical Personnel Also Carry Out Exercises. Even at Sea"]

[Text] A tactical-special exercise to deploy posts for the reception of wounded and casualties and organize medical support for personnel in the event of a mass influx of casualties from a maritime theater of operations has been held under the leadership of Major-General (Medical Service) Georgiy Sharayevskiy, chief of the Navy Medical Service, on Kotlin Island.

One of the objectives of the exercise, the first on such a scale in the last 10-12 years, was to rehearse cooperation between medics from various branches of the Armed Forces. Lieutenant-General (Medical Service) Ivan Chizh, chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Main Military-Medical Directorate, was familiarized with the course of the exercise.

Official Describes Expedition to Komsomolets

LD0806124894 Moscow *Radio Moscow World Service*
in English 1810 GMT 7 Jun 94

[From the "Commonwealth Update" program]

[Text] The board of directors of the Russian ministry for emergency situations [Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies, and Natural Disasters] has held an open session to report on preparing an expedition to the Norwegian Sea, where the Komsomolets nuclear-powered submarine sank in deep waters. More from our correspondent Irina Korneyeva, and here is what she writes.

I shall remind our listeners that the two torpedoes with nuclear warheads, each containing 3,200 grams of plutonium-39, were most dangerous environmentally. The torpedo launchers were partially demolished due to the submarine's depressurizing. There is an imminent danger of radioactive leakage into the environment due to a free water exchange in the afore sections of the atomic submarine. According to some reports, this can become a reality in 1995. Therefore, a decision was taken in Moscow to carry on rescue works at the site of the Komsomolets wreckage this summer.

The director of the Main Board for Underwater Rescuing Missions, Mikhail Talokolnikov, describes the forthcoming mission as follows:

[Begin Talokolnikov recording, in Russian with superimposed English translation] To minimize radioactive leakage we have entrusted the mission with the following tasks. Firstly, the mission should try to partially seal the afore sections of the submarine, using deep water submersible apparatuses. Secondly, it should monitor the radio-ecology at the wreckage site in an attempt to pinpoint most likely directions of the plutonium products' diffusion due to corrosion. Thirdly, it would examine the hub of the submarine and the floating rescue camera box, which has broken up and now lies at the bottom six km to the west of the submarine.

I shall recall that the final pressurizing of the submarine hub is due to take place in 1995. This will be a second stage in implementing the safety of the submarine. Special rubber seals were developed to block a possible radioactive leakage due to a corrosion. The first consignment is already aboard a research vessel, Academician Keldysh. These rubber seals will be mounted from the Mir manned deep submersibles, equipped with manipulators. An expert analysis shows these works will present no dangers to pilots or to the environment. Besides, the submersibles are relatively cheap. Their manufacturing costs will exceed the monitoring costs only by 15 or 20 percent and will amount to 4.6 billion rubles, \$4.1 million.

As to the ecological monitoring, a wide-ranging program is envisaged. Diverse and novel types of equipment are to be tested during the pending mission. One of the appliances will stay at the bottom of the sea to register medium radiation for one year after the mission is over. This will be done for the first time in the history of underwater works. Now a wide ecological monitoring is necessary, for real background readings at the site of the wreckage are particularly important if taken this year. If this is done experts will be able to monitor the changes in the environment pollution. [end recording]

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Military Construction Workers Strike Over Underfunding

PM0706125594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Viktor Litovkin: "Military Construction Personnel on Strike. They Are Not Asking for Money, They Want To Earn It"]

[Text] Worrying reports are coming in from military districts and fleets. The latest was from the Northern Fleet. An

unprecedented event has occurred there—military construction personnel have gone on strike. According to our information, around 2,000 military construction personnel, including 915 commissioned and 200 warrant officers, and 8,500 of their civilian colleagues have not received full pay since the beginning of the year. The military personnel are there to serve, but there is no work for them. There are no construction materials and the electricity has been switched off.

They received only one-third of the pay for a completed production assignment, and then a large part of this sum was automatically taken off them by the city bank in Murmansk for overdue municipal payments and taxes. The military construction personnel marched to the central square in Severomorsk, the fleet's main base, to demand money, to demand that their minimum social needs be met.

"The situation is critical, unfortunately," I was told by Lieutenant General Oleg Borisov, deputy chief of Construction and Troop Billeting of Russia's Armed Forces, when I asked him to comment on the report. "And not only in the Northern Fleet. We have unpaid accounts totaling half a trillion rubles [R], and I have no idea where we are going to get the money to settle up with the construction personnel."

The Army constructs housing and other facilities—combat missile complexes, naval stations, airfields, and nuclear weapon dumps—using state funds. According to the draft federal budget, R3.7 trillion were to be allocated for this purpose, although the requirement was three-four times greater, but the military had received only R795 billion as of 25 May.

Moreover, in May the allocation of money for the construction of housing was 30 percent down on April. Military construction personnel I know told me that if it goes on like this the military construction complex will collapse altogether.

The problem is aggravated by the fact that under the state program providing housing for servicemen, as approved by the president, the army was supposed to construct 220,000 apartments in 1993-1995 from federal budget means. Local authorities were constructing another 180,000 apartments for officers discharged into the reserve or who have retired. This would make it possible by the end of this year to cut the number of people waiting for apartments to 118,000. Now, because of the failure of the program, the waiting list, instead of decreasing, will increase to 155,000 families. Incidentally, the army's figure for people without apartments now stands at 133,700.

Even the 8 billion plus German marks allocated by the FRG to house families leaving Germany and credits from other foreign states are not much help. The problems are not solved merely by 40,000 extra apartments. Moreover, there is no money for the construction of cultural and consumer facilities, as the official documents say, alongside the housing: boiler houses, stores, kindergartens, schools and hospitals, utilities. How can you give people houses without heating, water, and drains?

One reason for the parlous state of the army's military construction complex is the fact that the money allocated by the state budget for the construction of housing was not fully indexed by the Finance Ministry, or the indexing came very late. The money that has entered the military units' accounts is not commensurate with the current levels of prices of construction materials, electricity, heat, and machinery. Because of this, a debt of R290 billion built up last year. Only R110 billion were allocated to pay the debt. The question is—Where to get the remaining R180 billion.

But, according to generals I know, the military does not want and does not intend to go cap in hand to the government. The military is well aware that state money is in short supply, so it is prepared to seek its own way out of the situation.

For instance, it constructed 3,000 apartments last year using nonbudget sources—sale of vacant property that no longer had any military importance, and wheeled engineering equipment—and the resources of housing construction cooperatives and individual builders. Just as many will be provided this year. But these apartments are a drop in the ocean of housing problems.

The military is prepared to use the experience accumulated by Moscow construction workers, who, despite meager funding, are annually providing thousands of apartments for people on the waiting list and providing their construction complex with new machinery and materials. This is being done in Moscow by auctioning off part of the housing constructed under city plans.

Why does this right not extend to military construction personnel? They would be able to partly rectify matters by auctioning off a proportion of the apartments they have constructed.

Taxes are another problem. The army being what it is, a state institution that is unable to make a profit, it should be exempt from transport and special taxes, payment for allocation of land, and from value-added tax.... All this takes the lion's share of the budget funds allocated to it for capital construction and restricts the latter's pace and potential.

According to the plan, military construction personnel currently owe officers 20,000 apartments. This figure could double by the end of the year. Dozens of military construction units are without work. In the Northern Fleet they have now switched to ways of fighting for their rights, such as strikes, which are unthinkable as far as the military is concerned.

But there is still no visible way out of the crisis for them.

PEACEKEEPING FORCES

TV View of Peacekeeping Battalion in Training

LD0306191494

[Editorial Report] St. Petersburg Fifth Channel Television Network in Russian at 1605 GMT on 3 June broadcasts the "Weekdays" current affairs program, which this week visited a Russian battalion of peacekeeping forces formed on

the basis of the 129th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, and soon to be deployed in South Ossetia after completing specialist training near St. Petersburg. The program is 12 minutes long.

Interviewed at the beginning of the feature, Major-General N.F. Tkachev, commander of the Russian peacekeeping motor rifle division, comments on the status of his command: "We are an ordinary Land Forces unit, a motor rifle division, which is charged with carrying out the duties of a peacekeeping unit, an essential function that arose when conflicts in our former republics on the borders of Russia began. We are guided by our training program for peacekeeping forces subunits, which was developed by the Land Forces General Staff. Unfortunately, it has to be said that we still have no legal documentation to establish the status of our duties. There is an order by the defense minister which determined additional privileges on the basis of Russian legislation for those soldiers who carry out their duties in conflict areas. So far there is no other document."

On the proportion of soldiers serving by contract in conflict areas, Tkachev says: "We have conscripts and we have contract servicemen. In the battalion that is in Tskhinvali at the moment there are about 70 contract servicemen. Officers and warrant officers are practically all on contracts. Other ranks, conscripts, naturally carry out the same duties as they do. Today we only send volunteers, be they on contracts or conscripted, and only after careful training. That is, all those who are now being sent to the conflict zones have served a minimum of six months."

A major, identified by caption as "AP Prilepin, regimental psychologist," explains in an interview that volunteers for service in conflict areas are carefully screened and selected for given specialities in particular units, with unsuitable candidates being rejected. His duties also include psychological support for soldiers, he says: "The peace-keeping duties that face us are of a kind that demand the development and provision of a whole complex of measures, including essential psychological rehabilitation during and after service there."

Vox pops with individual soldiers on their fears at being sent to a conflict area then follow. The soldiers emphasize that they are volunteers and satisfied at having received additional training to fulfill their new role, but said they have little idea of what awaited them in their new posting.

Captain K.P. Samosyuk, company commander, agreed that training could be improved to take account of local conditions. "Additions to the training program for peacekeeping forces are essential. More specialized training should be introduced, and physical training. Because the soldiers serving here are mostly conscripted from Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Vologda Oblast, and so on, while the peacekeeping mission has to be carried out—our division is in the Caucasus, in Moldavia [Moldova], mountainous places. And 18 months ago one battalion was sent to Tajikistan, another region a long way from our forested boggy part of the world."

Video throughout shows interviewees, training facilities, and large numbers of marching troops.

UKRAINE

Radetskyy on Importance of Military Councils in Armed Forces

94UM0411A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
11 May 94 p 2

[Article by General of the Army Vitaliy Radetskyy, minister of defense of Ukraine: "Military Councils: An Important Body in the Administration of the Organizational Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine"]

[Text] Military Councils as collegial advisory bodies in the Armed Forces of Ukraine have deep historical roots. There have always been military councils. The tradition of a collegial approach to deciding the most important questions and those having a bearing on the future emerged at the same time that a Ukrainian military force first began to form. The Zaporozhian Cossacks invested such councils with a special ritual.

The Zaporozhian Cossacks usually held their general councils on 1 January, on the feast of the Intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary [Pokrova] (the feast of the patron of the Zaporozhian church), on the second or third day of Easter, as well as at any other time that the Cossacks troops requested the convocation of a council.

The councils dealt with the most important matters affecting the life of the army: making peace and declaring war, organizing military campaigns, punishing criminals, and distributing lands and property among the *kurins* [barracks in which Cossacks lived in a permanent fortified camp or Sich, and, by extension, to the military unit that lived in them; also translated as a "platoon"]. The distribution of lands and elections were held every year without fail.

A few days before the council was to be held, the entire Cossack army gathered at the Sich. The Cossacks made special preparations for the council—they put on their best clothes and weapons and attended church, first matins and later Mass, which were celebrated with great ceremony on these days. These services were followed by communal noonday meals in the *kurins*.

After the meal, a cannon shot was fired to signal that the council was about to begin. A kettle-drum was brought out of the church, and the drummer sounded the preparatory signal. He was followed by the *Osavul* [Adjutant-General], who carried a large military banner into the main square. A second roll of the kettle-drum signaled the actual "assembly." The rank-and-file Cossacks were followed into the square by the *Starshyna* [Cossack Officer Corps] wearing the insignia of their rank. They were greeted by a drum roll. When they reached their assigned place, the officers bowed to the whole assembled company, which stood in a circle around the square.

After the lands had been distributed by lot, the *Koshovyv* [Sich Camp Commander] asked the assembled company if it wanted to change the entire Officer Corps in keeping with tradition at the start of a new year. In response, the Cossacks either supported his leadership, or they demanded that he lay down his mace [bulava]. In the event that the latter happened, the whole officer corps resigned, except for those

whom the Cossacks asked to stay on in their posts. Genuinely democratic elections were then held to elect candidates from all the *kurins*.

The election was also regulated by custom: each elected officer twice refused the post for which he had been chosen, while the ritual of smearing his head with dirt was to remind him not to think of himself as better than the rest of the Cossack brotherhood. If a foreign ambassador was present at the Council in order to make some request of the Cossacks, he set forth the terms he was offering before the entire company, after which the matter was decided in his absence. If there was disagreement between the officers and the rank and file, 20 representatives were elected, who conducted detailed talks with the ambassador and concluded an agreement.

There was no formal vote: the matter was decided by acclamation, that is, by a decisive numerical majority voicing support for a decision.

In addition to general councils, if the *Starshyna* did not want to convoke such a council, there were smaller councils "in the *kurins*," called *skhodky*: the otamans [leaders] of the *kurins* gathered in the Camp Commander's *kurin* [kurin kosho-voho]. These meetings were held to discuss minor campaigns and secret and urgent matters.

Small councils [skhodky] in the *palankas* [the eight military districts outside the Sich in the so-called "Free Lands of the Zaporozhian Forces"] dealt with insignificant matters and were held by married Cossacks who lived outside the Sich.

By the end of the 17th century, a General Council was called only to elect the Hetman or ratify treaty articles with Moscow; other matters were decided by a council of officers. This council met at Christmas or the feast of the Epiphany and at Easter. It dealt with planning campaigns, the construction of forts, and the maintenance of subunits. It was this council that came to resemble a real military council.

The things that are useful and warranted at each historical stage assume a new content to suit the needs of subsequent periods.

Today, when Ukraine is building her Armed Forces in difficult economic and sociopolitical conditions, military councils play a unique role. In accordance with the directive issued by the President of Ukraine on 24 March 1993, which ratifies the Statute on the Military Collegium of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Statute on Military Councils in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, they have the status of permanent collegial advisory bodies.

One of the main tasks of today's military councils is to work out recommendations on such issues as maintaining the combat and mobilizational readiness of forces, strengthening military discipline and the social and legal protection of military personnel, improving the effectiveness of the exercise of command over the troops, conferring military ranks and awards, receiving reports from commanders of subunits within the different combat arms and formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and from the military districts on their activity, and submitting their conclusions to be included in drafts of normative acts to be sent to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

What is new in the work of the military councils?

Today's military councils play an important role as a collegial organ in implementing cadre policy. This procedure for appointing generals and officers to responsible posts and for conferring military ranks precludes the kind of protectionism that we often saw in the past. The military council deals with the issue of training reserve cadres.

In their work, the military councils are guided by the constitution and laws of Ukraine, the decrees of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, the edicts and directives of the president of Ukraine, the decrees and directives of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the decisions of the Defense Council of Ukraine, and the orders and directives of the minister of defense of Ukraine.

To guarantee that the military council performs its tasks effectively, its chairman must ensure that the discussion of issues at the council meetings is unconstrained, principled, and comprehensive and that the views of all participants are taken into account when decisions are made. He also sees to it that the council's decisions are implemented.

It has become customary for members of the council to make regular reports about their personal role in carrying out the council's decisions and on questions pertaining to preventing accidents and traumatism among military personnel, the guards, etc. There is now greater oversight of implementation of the council's decisions, translated into orders issued by commanders: the commanders report on the execution of these orders.

After analyzing the positive results of the work of the Military Council of the Odessa Military District, it is clear that this council has introduced a fine tradition of conducting visiting sessions.

Such sessions are held directly in the combined formations, formations, and military units. At the same time, practical instruction on questions put on the agenda for discussion are held with commanders and chiefs of services. Urgent measures are applied on the spot to make the necessary provisions for combat instruction and other vital activities of the troops.

In my opinion, another positive fact is that participation in the meetings of the military councils and field exercises are not confined solely to the Chairman of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies, who is a member of the Military Council, but that representatives of the local state executive organs, of local and regional self-government organs, and of enterprises, institutions, and organizations are also invited. This gives them an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the kind of socioeconomic and purely military problems that the Armed Forces of Ukraine face today, as well as with the military equipment at the army's disposal.

In addition, this gives military personnel an opportunity to work more closely with the representatives of local government. As we know, every military formation is stationed on the administrative territory of an oblast or a rayon, and fulfillment of the laws of Ukraine on the social protection of military personnel depends in large measure on how well the military councils work with the leadership of local government organs. Neither the local authorities, nor the military

units can carry out such measures as organizing the defense and communications of a region, mobilization, conscription into military service, and military recruitment on their own. And what about purely everyday matters?! The oblasts and rayons rely on assistance from the military to bring in the harvest, while the latter, in turn, ask for help with housing.

It has become customary for the military councils to seek the help of the local authorities in preventing desertion and avoiding the draft.

One can make a long list of the issues that need to be solved jointly, but the key question facing both the military and local authorities is how to solve anything at all in the present state of overall economic decline.

Clearly, matters are not confined solely to economic and everyday social problems. Providing care for invalids and war and labor veterans, establishing patronage relations between enterprises and military units, and the military and patriotic education of youth—these are issues that have to be dealt with on a national scale.

Unquestionably, the military councils, like the Armed Forces of Ukraine, are still young, but in the short time that they have existed, a certain amount of positive experience has been accumulated which should be made public.

As Defense Minister of Ukraine, I do my best to ensure that the military councils of the Armed Forces of Ukraine not continue the worst traditions of the military councils of the former Soviet Army, in which these bodies performed punitive functions (deciding whom to dismiss from his post, whom to demote in rank, etc.). An officer left such military councils demoralized. Crudity, boorishness, and conduct humiliating to officers and generals were the hallmarks of these councils. As a rule, these were not gatherings at which colleagues met to exchange views, but rather a place where punishments were meted out.

Historical experience testifies that military councils should serve as assemblies of military personnel for consultation—that is, serve the very purpose they were meant to serve when they were first formed. As such, they will enhance the authority of the commander, provide him with an opportunity to reveal his personality, and strengthen the principle of unity of command [yedynonachalstvo]. This will allow him to put forward vitally important recommendations in all fields, ranging from the practical implementation of military policies in the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the things that pertain to the ordinary concerns of everyday life.

High Costs of Arms, Equipment Procurement Stressed

94UM0406A Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian
29 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Oleksandr Manachynskyy under the rubric "Point of View": "There Are Small Armies, but There Are No Cheap Ones..."]

[Text] *Regardless of the fact that the ideas of cutbacks in the army and weaponry, shutting down bases and withdrawing troops from foreign territories have moved to the practical*

plane, no one anywhere is talking about the complete elimination of armies. The discussion, on the contrary, concerns improving and optimizing them, and trying to make the armed forces effective and, at the same time, cheap.

So how are matters proceeding in Ukraine? No one has any doubts that the army costs a lot and needs to be cut back. But what are the realities? Defense appropriations under the approved budget are 14,741,870 karbovantsi (1.17 billion dollars at the exchange rate of 12,600 karbovantsi to the dollar used by the National Bank, or 387,945,000 dollars at the market settlement rate of 38,000 karbovantsi to the dollar). Is that a lot or a little? Let us compare. The 1993 defense budget for Slovakia was equal to 284,340,000 dollars, Poland 2.25 billion, Hungary 1.16 billion and neutral Sweden, which maintains an army of 65,000 people, 5.24 billion dollars. The planned U.S. military budget for the 1994 fiscal year is 263.7 billion dollars, with overall military spending as a percentage of GNP in 1992, according to the data of SIPRI, 5.4 percent in the United States, 4.0 percent in Great Britain, 3.9 percent in Turkey, 3.4 percent in France and 2.2 percent in Germany.

Military spending per capita will reach 1,100 dollars this year in the United States, 730 in Great Britain, 810 in France, 815 in Norway and 500 dollars in Greece and the FRG. They are 283,500 karbovantsi (at the different exchange rates, from 7 to 21 dollars) in Ukraine.

The following circumstances should also be taken into account when evaluating the military budget of Ukraine:

First, the increase in inflation in Ukraine in 1993 was approximately 47 percent a month, so it is being cut back substantially every year even without any formal reduction in military spending.

Second, it must be kept in mind that the cost of military hardware and weaponry, as well as some types of operations, has increased substantially with the transition to economic accountability and self-financing.

Third, the cutbacks in the size of the armed forces and the realization of the START-I treaty, as well as the conversion of the military-industrial complex, will require additional appropriations rather than cutbacks in the first few years.

Fourth, it should be taken into account that the military inventories are filled to overflowing with obsolete hardware, and the weaponry and hardware needed to replace them are expensive. All of this in the aggregate is not fostering an augmentation of military might and reserve capacity and, most likely, gives rise to the question of whether it will be very easy to provide for defensive sufficiency under such conditions. The answer suggests itself.

It is not just a matter of the military budget, however, but also its structure. The distribution of overall appropriations of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine by dedicated purposes is not precisely known, but one can already state today that the funds that are being allotted for the procurement of weaponry and military hardware are insufficient, since the rate of aging of that material is quite high. The military budget for 1994, with a regard for the current social and economic situation, is naturally quite large. The funds that

are being allocated for the country's defense, however, do not seem all that large against the background of the overall non-productive expenditures and losses in the national economy, as well as the presence of criminal capital in the country (which includes the "shadow" economy), which are measured in the hundreds of millions of karbovantsi. And the fulfillment of the requirements of the Military Doctrine and the implementation of the armaments program, the realization of which has been approved, does not withstand any criticism at this time. The picture is similar with the financing of military scientific projects aimed at the development of modern types of weapons. Here is an example: Science is an average of about 15 percent of military spending for the Americans. The U.S. government spends 76 billion dollars on all science today. Sixty percent of that is for purely military programs.

The breakdown of budgetary appropriations for defense in Ukraine gives no precise answer as to how much of the budgetary funding is going to science. The amount of that spending, in the estimation of specialists, is less than ten percent, and that naturally provides no opportunity to conduct basic and investigative research.

This situation is leading to entirely foreseeable consequences in the near future—we will not be able to create advanced weapons systems. We will not be able to if the state—and there is still no other customer or other source of financing aside from the state budget in Ukrainian military science—does not direct the necessary quantity of funds to basic and investigative research, the development of dual-purpose high technologies and the creation of scientific and technical potential.

It should be borne in mind that equipping the troops with weaponry and military hardware depends substantially on the state of the economy. Moreover, the influence of scientific and technical progress on the quality of those weapons and military hardware is being manifested in more and more pronounced fashion of late. There is rapid growth in the cost of weaponry and other materiel, first and foremost owing to the large concentration of efforts in scientific research and development connected with the creation and production of new arms systems.

The sharp rise in the cost of weapons is restricting ever more the capabilities of the economy with regard to their mass production. A trend toward compensating for quantitative indicators through qualitative characteristics—an increase in destructive power, accuracy etc.—is thus being noted even today in foreign armies. This inevitably leads to further complexity, and hence, to increases in the cost of the weapons.

Spending has increased considerably on the operation of the weaponry, which is now approximately half of the funds that are spent for the technical equipping and upkeep of the armed forces. The cost of operating some of the most complex combat systems is sometimes even higher than the cost of production.

Military-economic spending is also increasing as a result of the increased speed of the obsolescence of weaponry. The upgrading of the armaments of the NATO armies thus

occurred every 15 years in the 1950's, every 10 years in the middle of the 1960's and is now approximately every 6-7 years. The replacement periods of weaponry have been shortened so much that some models are removed before the start of series production. That is the fate that befell the Sergeant York self-propelled anti-aircraft gun mount in the United States in the 1980's.

The funds for the procurement of weaponry and military hardware for Ukraine, in the estimation of specialists, do not exceed 20 percent—they are, that is, not all that much. This could have a negative effect on the condition of enterprises in the defense sectors of industry, and cause an increase in the ranks of the unemployed. The defense complex, aside from the social consequences, could also lose its basic scientific and industrial potential, in which advanced technologies are concentrated. The outflow of highly skilled specialists is even today leading to a weakening of the position of Ukraine in the creation of high-technology models of weapons and military hardware. All of this will ultimately cause the appearance of a threat to the national security of Ukraine.

Communications Head Samoylenko Reviews Branch's Progress

94UM0411B Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian
6 May 94 p 1

[Article by Lt. Gen. Valentyn Samoylenko, chief of communications of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: "In Full Swing. The Signal Troops of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at Work"]

[Text] Military communications evolved in the remote past, when the unique features of East Slavic military art began to emerge. At that time, troops in the battlefield were led by voice commands, the personal example of their commanders, and signals sent by audible devices. That is how commanders passed on orders and instructions and received reports.

However, these simple means of communication could be used to exercise command over troops only as long as military actions took place on small areas of land, usually on open ground, and commanders personally observed the battlefield.

Fundamentally new means of communication came into use in the wars fought in the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century—the telegraph and the telephone, the invention of which was made possible by the important contributions of such leading scientists and inventors as T.L. Shyelling, V.S. Yakobi, V.B. Yakobi, P.M. Holubysky, Ye.I. Hvozdyov, A.A. Stolpovsky, and others.

On 25 April (7 May) 1895, an important event took place in the history of mankind. On this day, A.S. Popov, in a paper delivered at the session of the Physical Division of the Russian Physico-Chemical Society, reported the discovery of a new means of communicating—radio. The device he created made it possible to transmit electrical oscillations (signals) without wires. This was a truly great discovery.

From this moment on, scientists in many countries began working intensively on the practical application of this wonderful phenomenon.

Radio technology [radiometody], which involves the generation and propagation of radio waves, also forms the basis of radio-relay, tropospheric, and space communication lines, radio broadcasting, television, radiometry, photography, and many other fields.

Radio communication uses wave frequencies that range from hundreds of hertz to tens and more gigahertz (GHz). Very low frequency [VLF], low frequency [LF], high frequency [HF], and ultrahigh frequency [UHF] radio communication lines enable control in all fields of human endeavor. Radio performs miracles. Radio waves are reflected from meteor trails, and they penetrate the thickness of the ocean's waves; they are used underground and in space; they bring us information about other bodies in the universe.

Radio communication plays a particularly important role in the Armed Forces. Clearly, no modern war can be won without reliable, uninterrupted communications. To lose the ability to communicate means to lose the ability to control your forces, and the loss of the ability to exercise command over forces inevitably results in defeat. This fundamental principle, established during the years of the Great Patriotic War, remains equally important today.

Radio makes it possible to exercise command over troops and weapons at any time of the year and at any time of day or night, requiring no search and no superstructure [bez poshuku and bez nadbudovy], when stationed in one place and when on the move, over the heads of the enemy.

Modern military radio equipment makes it possible to block the interception of information and sometimes even to prevent the discovery that radio waves are being used.

This radio equipment has made it possible to create fundamentally new organizational structures of mobile signal centers at various echelons of command. These structures are easily operated, mobile, and provide commanders and staffs with means of communication both in place and on the move [na misti i v rusi].

The role of technical training of military personnel—of every soldier and every commander—has grown immeasurably in modern times. The range of skills that a member of the signal troops [voyin-svyazkivets] has to master has expanded significantly. Thus an officer must have the knowledge and skills of a well-trained service engineer. Sergeants and privates can also be trained to perform the tasks of technicians or mechanics. This has established the requirements in the training of signal troops. The majority of graduates of military signals schools, training units, and subunits are true masters in their field, capable of operating complex modern equipment.

In the experienced hands of military signals personnel, the means of communication make it possible for the command [komanduvannya] to exercise uninterrupted and timely control of forces and weapons. And the signal troops of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have experienced hands.

The Signal Troops of the Armed Forces of Ukraine work diligently and painstakingly to hone their professional skills. During the winter academic term, a series of complex training exercises involving the radio communications system were carried out by the Signal Troops of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The results of the exercises revealed excellent skills in operating complex radio communications equipment by signals specialists and the ability of officers to command subordinate subunits in providing support in the control and command of troops.

The collectives commanded by officers V. Mystyuk, I. Royenko, V. Shevchyk, A. Yemets, and S. Maslov perform with special distinction. The discipline, assiduity, and excellent knowledge of regulation equipment [vyvirena tekhnika] exhibited by the personnel of these units and subunits allows them to perform their assigned tasks quickly and with a high degree of efficiency.

Officers V. Sanarov, S. Butuzov, V. Tabak, A. Levchenko, V. Lysakonov, S. Dmytriyenko, and F. Kulishenko have shown themselves to be excellent specialists and good methodists [metodysty].

Many good things can be said about the crews [ekipazhi] led by warrant officers Yu. Semenov, V. Rybachuk, S. Pyenkin, V. Bryshchatyy, P. Bondar, V. Mandalya, V. Dehtyarov, and S. Litvynenko. Even in peacetime, the signals personnel continue to perform their professional duties in the ranks of the UN peacekeeping forces in the former Yugoslavia. M. Metla, V. Kichkar, V. Kulykov, S. Kyrpychnyy, and L. Zolotoholovyy perform their duties with distinction.

Watch duty [boyove cherhuvannya] is part of performing a battle mission [boyove zavdannya]. The high degree of responsibility and conscientiousness exhibited by A. Volva, M. Chechko, M. Hrytsyuta, S. Derkach, V. Bilenkyy, Yu. Prokhorov, I. Kulyk, Yu. Mostovyy, and V. Oliynyk have won them the respect of their commanders and peers.

Much praise is merited by female military personnel and employees [viyskosluzhbovtsi i sluzhbovtsi] of the Armed Forces who serve as radio operators, telegraph operators, and telephone operators [radysty, telegrafisty, telefonisty]. In particular, employees [sluzhbovtsi] of the Armed Forces M. Kornet and L. Matveyeva.

The annual reinforcement of the officer corps of the Signal Troops with graduates of the Kiev Institute of Control and Command and Signals [instytut upravlinnya i zvyazku] and the Poltava Higher Military Command Signals School [vyshe viyskove komandne uchylyshche zvyazku] also contributes to the excellent performance of tasks designed to guarantee communications. A great deal of effort and energy is devoted to the training of future officers by instructors V. Starkov, V. Dudolad, and V. Tymoshynskyy.

On the eve of the Great Victory Day over fascism, I would like to wish veterans and young soldiers, experienced and novice signals personnel good health, personal happiness, and continued success in the building of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and ensuring these forces with a high degree of combat readiness.

Kobzar Stresses Strengthening Discipline in 26 April Address

94UM0405C Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian*
29 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Inf. NA: "Strengthen Discipline and Learn To Work in a New Way"]

[Text] The chief of the Main Directorate of Indoctrination and Socio-Psychological Work of the Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kobzar, spoke to the attendees and instructor personnel of the Scientific-Research and Methodological Center of the main directorate on April 26. These meetings with educational officers who are studying at the two-month skills-enhancement courses have become a tradition.

Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kobzar called the attention of the officers to the political situation surrounding the Crimea, and related in detail the work of the Ministry of Defense [MO] delegation during the recent meeting of the ministers of defense of Ukraine and Russia in Sevastopol.

Anatoliy Oleksiyovych, speaking of problems in the life and activity of the military and the tasks of the bodies for indoctrination and socio-psychological work, dwelled on such important elements as mobilization readiness, the development of new forms and methods of influencing the personnel, military discipline and the training of cadres for indoctrination and socio-psychological work.

He pointed out in particular that the work of the bodies for VSPR [indoctrination and socio-psychological work] aimed at resolving the tasks of mobilization readiness is proceeding too slowly. This is explained by the fact, said Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kobzar, that we have squandered progressive work experience in this area and appreciably weakened its base. The task was posed to the officers in this regard, and directions for activity were indicated, of teaching people during periods of measures relating to mobilization readiness, gathering the necessary information and creating a suitable educational-materials base.

There are substantial areas of unfinished work that must be eliminated in the functional duties of the deputy battalion and company commanders for indoctrination and socio-psychological work with regard to the training and indoctrination of the more active core personnel from among conscript servicemen. It was pointed out that these classes (actions at various levels of combat readiness) should necessarily conclude with the combat coordination of the subunits and the active personnel.

The chief of the Main Directorate for VSPR, speaking of the development of new methods of influencing servicemen, emphasized that we should have a creative approach to the indoctrination of people, rather than simply carrying over mindlessly the forms and methods of former party-political work, and make more extensive use of television and radio, newspapers and journals so as to create an information expanse not just within the Armed Forces, but also all around them.

The capabilities of humanities training, the Centers for Culture and Leisure, ethnic studies rooms and unit clubs are

also not being utilized to the full extent, the speaker pointed out. Opportunities in the regions where units are stationed should also be utilized more extensively in this regard.

Particular attention was devoted to the upsurge in military discipline, and strengthening it.

Concern was expressed with regard to the fact that some officers and warrant officers have been avoiding indoctrination work with their subordinates, and are moreover themselves not setting an example with regard to service.

The tasks of the educational officers flow out of this; they should, figuratively speaking, take their place in battle in the prevailing situation. This signifies that they should not stand in for the work of the commanders, they should not duplicate them, but should rather supplement that work with the specific forms and methods that are characteristic of VSPR.

It was understood that the deputy commanders for VSPR, in order to conduct indoctrination and socio-psychological work successfully in the collectives, have to improve their own knowledge and skills more actively, making maximum use for that purpose of the opportunities of the Professional Training Day in the units. All of the workers in indoctrination and socio-psychological work must be given opportunities for training on that day.

Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kobzar answered the questions of those in attendance after his speech.

Expanded Military Collegium Meeting Considers Future Force Development

94UM0405B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
30 Apr 94 p 1

[Item from press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "Session of the Military Collegium of the Ministry of Defense"]

[Text] An expanded session of the Military Collegium was held yesterday at the Ministry of Defense [MO] of Ukraine. It was chaired by Minister of Defense General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetsky. The state program for the building and development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was reviewed. The members of the collegium analyzed the long-term plan for the building of the Ukrainian military—the three stages of which are planned to conclude in the year 2000—proceeding from the provisions of the law "The Defense of Ukraine" and the military doctrine of the state. That program will be submitted, after its refinement, for the consideration of the State Defense Council.

Also considered was the question of measures for further improvements in the training of skilled personnel at military educational institutions. It was noted that the work on the reformation of the system of military education in Ukraine has been carried out with insufficient preparation and with a whole series of mistakes. All of these errors have been taken into account, and a system of measures has been developed to promote improvements in the training of military personnel.

Representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and scientists took part in the work of the collegium.

Air Defense Training, Readiness Problems Aired

Zaporizhzhya Garrison Difficulties

94UM0390A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
11 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Capt. Oleksandr Dranikov: "Garrison Life: A Concerned Individual's View: Are Secrets the Only Thing Being Protected From Outsider Eyes in the Zaporizhzhya Garrison's Air Defense Unit?"]

[Text] "Did you say the military unit?" asked the old man. "I usually walk through its territory on my way home from the bus stop. It's closer that way because it saves me walking around," continued my guide. Exchanging the customary phrases about the weather and the price of bread, we found ourselves near a gray fence.

"You need to go that way," said my new acquaintance and pointed to the right.

"What about you?" I asked, knowing that the old man also had to cross the territory of the military unit.

"No-o-o," he drawled. "I pass through a hole in the fence, not through the checkpoint [kontrolno-propusknyy punkt]."

With that we parted. About two hundred meters away, I saw a rickety white-and-blue gate, behind which I could see the parade ground. My arrival elicited no reaction from the soldiers at the checkpoint. The duty officer [cherhovyy chastyny], who stood next to them, also showed no special interest in the unknown officer. A live broadcast of the Winter Olympic Games was being shown on television. I remembered the talkative grandfather and thought to myself: "The old man needn't have crawled through his hole; he could have walked through the checkpoint without bending his back, both literally and figuratively." No one stopped me; only the need to find out where I could find the commander forced me to introduce myself to the duty officer [cherhovyy chastyny]. So much about what actually happened.

In theory, however, the relevant officials of the SAM brigade vigilantly supervise compliance with the checkpoint regime and thereby, the protection of military secrets.

On my second day on this assignment, I was asked to submit my pass allowing me to work in the operational units. Inasmuch as I did not have one, I was refused permission to visit the battalion on duty. There's no finding fault with that. Colonel Shetulsky, the deputy commander of the brigade, was acting in accordance with his orders and instructions. I had to be content with collecting materials in the support subunits and staff offices.

However, it was not the wounded pride of a journalist that compelled me to take up my pen. I simply began to have some doubts: Are military secrets the only thing being protected from outsider eyes in the unit?

About an hour before a trip that ultimately did not take place (and they did not ask to see my pass until almost the

moment before I was to get into the car that was leaving for the garrison of a group of battalions, the brigade's officers told me that the buildings of the officer personnel of the battalions were extremely badly heated. The temperature in the apartments never rises above 18 degrees, and then only if electric heaters are used. Virtually all the residents use electric heaters, as a result of which power in the electric circuits falls to 150 volts, causing power failures.

In addition, the children of the officers are not always able to get to school. Because of fuel shortages, the school bus did not operate on a regular schedule. This circumstance became the subject of serious discussion at the corps commander level. Following this, the situation improved. "Internal reserves" were found at brigade headquarters. But after a month or two, the children were once again running about the base instead of attending school.

Obviously, the fuel situation is critical. Even the training of the launcher crews has to be conducted in the manner of "simulate manually, what the machine would do". Although, frankly, this kind of training is of little use. In order to approach the launching equipment, the driver of the loading vehicle must back up some 30 meters onto rails. This requires practice, not simulation. The total distance that the loading vehicle has to travel during training is only 200 meters. If there is not enough gasoline to travel 200 meters, what hope is there of transporting school children, who need to be driven ten kilometers?

But not all the vehicles in the unit are laid up. There seems to be enough gasoline for the command vehicles. I saw for myself that the "personalky" [personal use vehicles] do not spend too much time in the car pool.

It is possible that things are not all that bad in the brigade. But I cannot judge, because I did not see. The "facilities" were not the only thing I was not allowed to visit; they did not let me into the residential zone of the base of the battalion group [mistechko hrupy dyvizioniv], nor into the soldiers' barracks. I have reported only what I learned from the officers. Probably the laurels of the literary hero who loved to bellow "No admittance!" give some officials no peace.

Follow-Up, Reply From Zaporizhzhya

94UM0390B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
27 Apr 94 p 1

[NARODNA ARMIYA report under the rubric "Response": "Are Secrets the Only Thing Being Protected From Outsider Eyes?"]

[Text] Issue No. 43 of our newspaper of 11 March 1994 published a report under the above title describing the unsatisfactory organization of military service in the air defense unit of the Zaporizhzhya garrison. The editors received a letter signed by Col. A. Toropchyn, which reads, in part:

"...A number of things described in the article were indeed true... The command of the Southern Region of the Air Defense Forces of Ukraine met with the officials of the unit. The article 'Are Secrets the Only Thing...' was discussed in

the directorate and the subdivisions of the unit. A series of additional measures were worked out to improve the organization of military service in the unit, the performance of his duties by the duty officer, and compliance with the checkpoint regime. Steps have also been taken to prevent late deliveries of fuel and lubricants to the subunits, and regular transportation of children to school has been organized. Passenger cars are to be used only for duties involving combat readiness..."

Command and Control Problems Affect Training

94UM0390C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
27 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt Yuriy Povkh: "The SAM Operators Did Not Have 'To Shoot' in the Rear Hemisphere."]

[Text] I have visited the command post of the Air Defense Forces many times. And even though I did not have a sense of seeing something new when I looked at the numerous screens and monitors [tablo], on this occasion, as well, I could not rid myself of the feeling that I was in the most important facility. How else could it be, given that everything that happens here is the final result of the work of all the country's air defense forces?

The training exercise that was being conducted that day at the command post's intelligence-gathering and information processing center [RITs] was no exception.

In our present situation, it is no exaggeration to say that it is very important to have as much information about the enemy as possible. This is especially true in the case of the Air Defense Forces. Without accurate and timely information about hostile aircraft, the highly accurate SAM complex and interceptors remain blind. To prevent this from happening, the Radiotechnical Troops of the Air Defense Forces of Ukraine constantly conduct training exercises at various levels of subordination for the purpose of improving the effectiveness of air reconnaissance.

...It is never quiet and calm in the RITs room. Information about the situation in the air over the whole country and beyond its borders arrives here all day and all night from subunits, command posts, units, and formations stationed across the whole of Ukraine. The large screen was lit up with markers of planned [side-] numbers [borty]. Every so often, the monitor lit up—a new target had appeared. However, the first part of the exercise was already in full swing. As it progressed, the officers of the RITs command post and their colleagues from the mobile command post were undergoing a theoretical test of their knowledge of documents on organizing combat duties, combat operations in the RITs, and the operational use of the combat arms of the Air Defense Forces. The usual procedure was used: a question on a card, twenty minutes to prepare, and then the answer. The examiners were officers in charge of the training exercise. Col. R. Kim, chief of the combat training division of the Radiotechnical Troops [RTV], and Col. H. Avramenko, chief of the command post of the Air Defense Forces, did not stint in asking additional questions to assess how well the officers were prepared. Lt. Col. O. Ohoreltsev and Lt. Col. V. Moshenskiy demonstrated excellent skills. Lt. Col.

Serebryakov and majors Kolesnikov and Polyanskyy gave assured answers. On the other hand, officers Potyomkin, Kublo, Sokol, and Latyshkevych gave answers that were not up to their expected level of knowledge. They ran into difficulties answering questions on the structure and organization of foreign armies and on the tactical and technical features of Air Defense equipment.

After the last answer is heard, the examiners announce the results. Officials are charged with holding additional classes on subjects in which individual officers demonstrated insufficient proficiency. This time no drastic measures are taken; requirements with respect to the theoretical knowledge of officers are very strict at the command post. An unsatisfactory level of knowledge can result in disciplinary action here, even removal from the performance of service duties.

Then the crew take up their usual places. The last orders ring out. The numbers on the electronic clock have already passed the "H-hour".

Groups of "enemy" targets begin to appear on the screens and plotting boards, where just seconds ago there were only individual blips. Several directions light up virtually at the same time. More than half the blips symbolizing the "enemy" are red in color. These need to be dealt with first, because these targets are coming it at low and very low altitudes. For that reason, the leader of the exercise gives special instructions on following them and producing the information needed to destroy them.

Gradually, the tension in the RITs approaches the critical point. But the faces of the officers of the duty watch remain calm and concentrated. Reports are coming in over the communication channels from the various sectors about the actions of the "enemy." The "enemy" gives no quarter, as they say. Across the entire range of altitudes, from very low all the way into the stratosphere, despite the mounting of active resistance, the strike group of targets is approaching ever closer to the country's border.

"In the southwestern sector, the target is... the command post!" states another report.

The information about this target is processed as quickly as possible and passed on to the commander for a decision.

Fighter aircraft lift off. Radar conditions become even more complicated. Given the situation, Col. R. Kim assigns part of the information for manual processing.

While the automated command and control system (ASU) responded faultlessly to changes in the situation in the air (it is, after all, a machine), those manning the plotting board performed somewhat less efficiently. Lacking sufficient experience, they were unable to deal with the large volume of work. As a result, the amount of information given them was decreased in the course of the exercise. Despite this, they made many mistakes in depicting the actions of "enemy" targets. This was revealed when they compared the situation on the map board with the attack plan. But it would not be fair to blame only those manning the plotting board. After all, their job is only the final link in the long information transmission chain, which consists of many specialists at

various levels. As became obvious later, the telegraph operators at the communications node also made mistakes. The RITs officers should also have reacted more decisively when information disappeared, and they should have acted more boldly in checking through the communication channels.

But this will become apparent later; meanwhile, the RITs is receiving the first reports about targets that have been destroyed. The numbered arrows that had just "crossed" the state border are being replaced by markers that resemble envelopes. However, it is too early to speak of complete success. There are still many hostile aircraft in the skies, attempting to reach their assigned targets.

Colonels R. Kim and H. Avramenko are devoting particular attention to the interaction of units and formations. Their concern is understandable: this is one of the most important prerequisites for carrying out the combat mission.

...The exercise is over. The hour of intense combat activity has passed with lightning speed. It is now time to analyze the actions of the duty watch of the RITs.

"The objective of this training exercise for the battle crew has been attained in all respects," states Col. H. Avramenko. "The work was done using both automated and nonautomated means, which required of the specialists the ability to combine these two methods during the course of a massive strike. The exercise also exposed the shortcomings in our work. Above all, it revealed an inability to quickly analyze the actions of the targets depending on their importance and other factors. It also revealed inadequate oversight of the quality and quantity of information. In the future, we will have to devote more attention to ensuring more decisive action by the crew of the RITs as well as the communications center specialists to avoid information gaps."

At the outset of the exercise, Hennadiy Volodymyrovych had said that when surface-to-air missile operators shoot in the rear hemisphere, this signifies a defect in the work the Radiotechnical Troops. Applying his statement to everything that I heard and saw, I think that the SAM operators would not need to do so. The level of air surveillance remains high, as does the performance of the brain center in this chain—that is, the RITs command post of the Air Defense Forces.

Defense & Security Commission Disbands, Notes Accomplishments

94UM0405A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
26 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by commission senior consultant Volodymyr Mokhurenko: "With a Sense of Duties Fulfilled"]

[Text] *The last session of the Commission of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on Issues of Defense and State Security with its current composition was held. Commission Chairman V. Lemish and its members—People's Deputies of Ukraine—exchanged ideas and summarized its legislative work over the last three years.*

The commission, created by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine in April of 1991, was able to work out a sound legal foundation for the creation of mechanisms for the practical

resolution of questions in the military sphere, the building of Ukraine's own armed forces and other military formations, and to provide for state security. The commission brought into development some 23 laws of Ukraine and 47 decrees of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on fundamental issues in the military sphere and state security, as well as 11 decrees and eight edicts of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine and nine directives of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.

The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on 11 October 1991 approved the conceptual framework for defense and the organizational development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine that was submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Commission of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on Issues of Defense and State Security, as well as the decree "The Creation of the Defense Council of Ukraine."

The laws of Ukraine "The Defense of Ukraine," "The Armed Forces of Ukraine," "The National Guard of Ukraine," "The State Border of Ukraine," "The Border Troops of Ukraine," "Universal Military Obligation and Military Service," "Mobilization Training and Mobilization," "Social and Legal Protections for Servicemen and the Members of Their Families" and "Pension Support for Servicemen and Individuals and Supervisory and Regular Personnel of Bodies of Internal Affairs," as well as the decrees of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on the procedure for the entry into force of those laws, were developed, prepared and adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine proceeding from the conceptual framework for defense and the organizational development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine also adopted the law "The Civil Defense of Ukraine."

The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine has approved the text of the Military Oath, the Statute on the Duties and Rights of Personnel in the National Guard of Ukraine, the size of the Border Troops, and the Statute on the Procedure for Manpower Acquisition for the military, logistical and financial support of the National Guard of Ukraine and the Border Troops of Ukraine.

The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine approved in October 1993 the Military Doctrine of Ukraine and defined its principal aspects, as well as approving the overall structure, size, weaponry and logistical support for the armed forces.

The participants in the parting session of the commission thus pass along to their successors—the newly elected People's Deputies of Ukraine—a full-fledged package of legislation on issues in the military sphere and state security, with a sense of duties fulfilled and wishes for success in the continuation of this work with regard to its improvement.

Pay Procedure Violations Investigated

94UM0405D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
12 Apr 94 p 1

[Item from the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "Materials From the Verification Have Gone to the General Procurator of Ukraine"]

[Text] Information was received by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine on violations of the prevailing legislation in the Financial and Economic Main Directorate. General of the Army of Ukraine Vitaliy Radetskyy charged the Control and Auditing Main Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense with conducting a comprehensive verification.

Instances of gross disregard for the requirements of laws by officials of the directorate were confirmed. The results of the verification were reviewed by the Military Collegium of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Since the violations that were ascertained require a legal evaluation by the procuracy and investigative bodies, the Military Collegium has made the decision to transfer the materials from the verification to the General Procurator of Ukraine.

BALTIC STATES

Discipline Violations in Armed Forces Detailed

944K1321A Riga DIENA in Latvian 11 May 94 p 7

[Article by Liga Laizane: "9,000 Discipline Violations in the Armed Forces."]

[Text] Riga, May 6. Last year, 9,000 discipline violations were found in the Armed Forces, as reported on Friday by Valdis Petersons, Chief of the Mobile Department and Personnel Department of the Armed Forces (AF), at the meeting of AF unit and subdivision commanders.

AF Commander Dainis Turlais stated at the meeting that the Army units are artificial creations, where interrelationships are regulated only by laws and regulations, not by personal sympathies or antipathies. The duties of the Army do not include the re-education, within 18 months, of hooligans into decent citizens.

Fifty-six percent of all violations, as mentioned by V. Petersons, were related to carelessness in the fulfillment of duties, involving violations during guard duty and internal service, 20 percent of violations—drinking, 16 percent—unauthorized departure from the post and not returning from leave on time, as well as 3 percent of cases of callous harassment of fellow servicemen. V. Liepins stated that the latter are difficult to identify because they are being covered up, and it could be assumed that there have been many more such cases. Specifically, those with the least education are the ones harassing their fellow servicemen.

Overall, regulations were mostly violated by soldiers in obligatory service, although 17 percent of these 9,000 violations were incurred by instructors, 3 percent by officers and 0.8 percent by deputy officers. Thirty new officers and 200 re-enlisted servicemen have been retired from duty because of drinking.

Last year, 16 servicemen lost their lives in the Armed Forces. Two of these were by suicide, and there were also 12 attempted suicides by servicemen. The remainder died in accidents. As stressed by Ivars Grava, Chief of the Legal Department of the Armed Forces, in the Army last year, not a single serviceman intentionally murdered another servicemen. Nevertheless, V. Liepins confirmed the facts that the body of one serviceman was found with knife wounds in

a courtyard of one of the houses on Marijas Street, and the body of one serviceman—by the railroad tracks. The causes of death for the others were drowning, traffic accidents while on leave, heart disease, and also two cases where the servicemen had not used care when handling their firearms.

The Chief of the Medical Service of the Armed Forces stated that a very serious problem in the Army is the development of psychological problems—pathological personality changes, which, especially in the first three months of duty, create a poor relationship with fellow servicemen, and the commanders are unable to deflect conflict situations. Because of this reason, many servicemen have been retired.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Defense Commission Chair Accuses Shevardnadze of 'Capitulation'

AU0706101394 Tbilisi MIMOMKHILVELI in Georgian
25 May 94 p 4

[Interview with Nodar Natadze, leader of the Georgian Popular Front, chairman of the Parliament Standing Commission on Defense and Security, by "Sakartvelos Khma" independent radio company correspondent Giorgi Kurdovanidze; place and date not given: "Eduard Shevardnadze Is Unable To Govern Georgia"—all questions published in boldface]

[Text] [Kurdovanidze] Batono [Georgian polite form of address] Nodar, during the signing of the treaty of 14 May on a full-scale political settlement to the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, the views of your commission were ignored. Will your commission make a statement about this at the next session of Parliament?

[Natadze] The views of our commission have indeed been ignored during the process of negotiations concerning the Abkhazian conflict. As we are unable to participate in the work of the Georgian delegation, it is natural that we will not be able to have any influence on the results of the negotiations. As regards making a statement in Parliament, the commission has specific plans but a statement will be made not on behalf of the commission but by ordinary parliamentarians.

[Kurdovanidze] Batono Nodar, your attitude to this document is well known. Could you comment briefly?

[Natadze] Our defeat in Abkhazia is possibly a double defeat: first de facto, second de jure. De facto, everything that could have been lost has already been lost except for the upper part of the Dali gorge. We gain nothing from a cease-fire; only in the Kodori gorge can there be a temporary cease-fire. Yet, this will also not be a victory because signing the treaty will not prevent the opposing side from engaging in warfare. As for the legal side, up to now, we had not lost; however, with this document, we have lost badly. Its signature means that the Georgian state is capitulating not only on the military front but also from the legal standpoint. It surrenders the most important defense barrier that we have in this sphere.

[Kurdovanidze] Batono Nodar, this document was preceded by eight agreements that were signed by the Georgian delegation. Is not the agreement of 14 May the logical result of that policy that has been conducted by the Georgian authorities over the last two years?

[Natadze] Of course. This is the logical escalation of our policy of capitulation. However, I wish to emphasize that the deterioration of our position and the development of the scenario do not come to an end with the signing of this document. The scenario embraces the following stages: When the Russian Army arrives on the left and right banks of the Enguri River and occupies a zone stretching approximately 20 kilometers, they will be given the chance to work on the citizens in the way they want. It is clear in what way this will be. They will try to activate those people who are dissatisfied with the government's policy and form an armed opposition, which will lead, if not to a civil war, then to civil strife and slaughter. Then, they will succeed in spreading tension to Poti. As soon as this happens, at the invitation of the authorities or even without it, they will enter Poti and occupy it. The whole scenario is developing in such a way that the Russians will occupy Poti. Why are they interested in doing this? Because, by taking Poti, they will cut off not only Georgia but also Armenia and Azerbaijan and the whole of Central Asia beyond the Caucasus from the ocean. In this way, the plan to create a West-East corridor will be thwarted for some time. Russia, on the other hand, will continue to exert total influence upon both the Caucasus and the whole of Central Asia. I do not exclude that, as early as two years ago, before the war in Abkhazia had begun, the wholly despicable campaign in Zugdidi and Tslenjikhha had been aimed at preparing the psychological ground for the future experiment with Poti.

The arguments presented by E. Shevardnadze that we need this document because Russia is powerful and we cannot resolve this problem without it, does not signify in any way that the problem will be solved following its intervention. It is possible that, on this occasion also, Russia will deceive us. The head of state likewise does not exclude this. Then, what is the point of trying something for the sixth time that has been attempted five times before? It turns out that Shevardnadze expects the Russians to go against what is written in the document. However, I view this to be naive.

[Kurdovanidze] That is to say, you believe that the government's and E. Shevardnadze's policy toward the Abkhazian problem cannot stand up to any criticism. Do you not think that one way of recovering Abkhazia is for the head of state to resign?

[Natadze] Shevardnadze is unable to govern Georgia. First of all, he cannot control the internal situation. He is unable to combat the wave of criminal gangs [bandokratia] and the economic collapse against which a struggle could be launched and is unable to create an army, which could be done very well. E. Shevardnadze is able to resolve diplomatic and political problems better than others and, therefore, his departure from the political arena would not be advantageous. Shevardnadze is of such value to us that we can pay a high price for him, but not any price. Consequently, it is necessary to limit considerably his powers. As

regards the internal government of the country, these functions should be transferred to more than one person. The Georgian Government's policy toward Russia has been one of capitulation from beginning to end and, in reality, disadvantageous to us. It is necessary for Russia to have a Georgian leader who is sympathetically disposed toward it and a government that is willing to please. Therefore, they will do everything to ensure that Georgia has a pro-Russian government.

[Kurdovanidze] Batono Nodar, does the parliamentary minority have a concrete plan of action regarding this question?

[Natadze] Today, in Parliament, there is no longer so much importance attached to how much support this or that position receives or to what extent it is well argued and how sound it is in essence because, in a crisis situation, support mechanisms change and, in the end, the greater part of the deputies in Parliament will adopt that position that it considers expedient. The session held on 13 May clearly showed us that Shevardnadze's position is extremely weak. As soon as it was demonstrated that the head of state was unable to hold the views that he used to, his blind followers began to abandon their positions like rats fleeing a sinking ship. For example, a meeting of the Union of Georgia's Citizens (I would call it the Union of Slaves) was held on Sunday that was designed from the start to be an extravagant congress, but few people turned up. I would call this meeting "Walpurgis morning" as the witches gathered in the morning instead of at night. Thus, we can use the following words to characterize Shevardnadze's policy—collaborationist and puppet-like in its status.

Russian Influence on Inexperienced Georgian Military Leadership

PM0706114194 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by Petr Karapetyan under "In the CIS Armies" rubric: "'The Russian General Will Come...,' They Said in Tbilisi. And He Has Come"]

[Text] Every spring there is a new Minister of Defense in Georgia....

Tengiz Kitovani became head of the military department in May 1992. The hero of the anti-Gamsakhurdia action and father of the National Guard immediately declared his intention to urgently set about building unified armed forces. But in the wake of the attacks on Russian military units (just take that one incident—there were casualties on both sides—with the tank regiment in Gori!), the hijacking of automobiles, the "privatization" of Russian servicemen's apartments, and the political intrigues, the good intention has remained precisely that—a good intention.

What is also indicative is whom Tengiz Kitovani (an architect by education; his military experience consists of three years of draft service in the Belorussian Military District) intended to build an army with. Tengiz Kalistratovich had as his deputy, for example, a man who was a complete civilian, although he had been elevated to general by the former. This was Tamaz Dumbadze, a graduate of the

Moscow Institute of Soviet Trade. And another general, also homegrown, with a diploma from a Georgian polytechnic institute, is Dzhehal Chumburidze, chief of the National Guard Main Directorate. He has been Deputy Defense Minister as of March 1993.

Incidentally, generals were appointed on the basis of completely farfetched talk to the effect that Georgians were not given promotions in the Soviet Army. And since that was the case, Tengiz Kalistratovich evidently decided, yesterday's colonels, lieutenant colonels, and captains should be raised to the rank of general. Everyone was rewarded! But was this done on merit?

Georgiy Karkarashvili. In 1990 he was a captain in the Soviet Army, chief of staff of an artillery division; and since 14 September 1992 he has also been a general in the Georgian Armed Forces. Paata Datuashvili. In 1990 he was a lieutenant colonel and commander of a rocket artillery division in the Transbaykal Military District. He has become a major general and Georgian first deputy defense minister.

The list of "wild-growing" generals can be continued. But are we talking only about generals? The commander of a detachment of seven or eight men has already called himself colonel and commander of a battalion. Hence the joke was born: "In the Georgian Army the first military rank is that of major."

Either there was no one to get involved in army organizational development or, despite the cunning nature of the propaganda of the time, no "Soviet generals," even retired ones, could be found?

But there are some. Colonel General Anatoliy Kamkamidze, Lieutenant Generals Levan Sharashenidze, Mikhail Elbakidze, and Robert Tavadze, Major General Panteleymon Georgadze.... They had served in the Soviet Army for decades, but they nevertheless did not get the top roles in the Georgian Army. Admittedly, Levan Sharashenidze spent four months as minister of defense (January-May 1992), until his first serious conflict with the leadership of the National Guard. Panteleymon Georgadze (the father of Igor Georgadze, the Republic's current security minister) spent some time in command of Border Guard Troops, but he did not last long after disagreeing with parliament in his views concerning the organizational development of the Army. The other "red generals" became the deputies of yesterday's captains.

On the other hand, the "armed men" in Georgia felt free under Tengiz Kalistratovich to earn their living sometimes by robbery and sometimes by terror.

Never mind robbery! The fall of 1992. There is war in Abkhazia and parliament is examining the composition of the new Cabinet of Ministers in Tbilisi. The deputies refuse to confirm Tengiz Sigua, Kitovani's comrade-in-arms in the anti-Gamsakhurdia action, in the post of prime minister. By a curious coincidence, it was precisely when National Guard troops started wandering the corridors of parliament (only the slow-witted did not realize why this should suddenly happen) and a rumor spread around town that "Kitovani's

guys" want to come to visit for a couple of days from Abkhazia that the deputies voted as one for Sigua.

Kitovani got his deserts several months later, in May 1993. The parliamentary deputies suddenly "remembered" that Tengiz Kalistratovich had not been confirmed in the post of minister of defense (and, it turned out, this should have been done straight after the parliamentary elections in fall 1992), and they rebelled, saying that this was out of order. The issue was put to the vote and was rejected. But Kitovani's game was already up by then. The Georgian detachments were suffering defeat after defeat in Abkhazia; it did not prove possible to tame the rebellious autonomous formation, as Kitovani had promised; disagreements with Eduard Shevardnadze intensified, and only one solution remained: To get out.

Which he did, having spoken to Georgiy Karkarashvili beforehand. What they talked about is unknown, but Karkarashvili often repeated afterward that if it had not been for the parting words of Kitovani, who "made him a man," he would not have complied with Eduard Shevardnadze's request that he become minister of defense. One way or another the new appointment took place—and, alas, in a form which ensured continuity of the style of leadership of the Armed Forces: Reforms were not carried out, and at the front things went worse than ever. There were ambitions and promises to launch a large-scale offensive against the Abkhazians (this brought a skeptical smile to the people who knew the state of the Georgian Armed Forces). In a word, Karkarashvili was like his teacher, and observers noted entirely fairly that the former captain was brave and knew how to fight, but was useless as a commander. In February 1994, in the wake of the Abkhazian nightmare, Georgiy Karkarashvili resigned. His relations with Eduard Shevardnadze appeared to have deteriorated seriously after Karkarashvili, during a Zviadist offensive in the west of the republic, repealed an order of the supreme commander in chief and refused to fight against Loti Lobaliya....

After Karkarashvili, the Georgian parliament prevaricated for almost four months over the appointment of a new minister. This time passed amid reflections about the future of the national army. Not just reflections, however. A resolution was adopted on the procedure for awarding military ranks. Given the complete anarchy of previous years in this respect, the step was a prudent one. The 300 Georgian officers who did not respond to the appeal to return from the Russian Army were discussed with bitterness. Furthermore, reports are coming into the Georgian Ministry of Defense's personnel organs with a request...to assist in transfers to the Russian Army: People have gotten fed up with low pay, the lack of social protection, the lack of any service prospects. Parliamentary Speaker Vakhtang Gogvadze spoke very emotionally and unexpectedly as follows: "Georgia will be free when a Russian general summons the leadership of the Georgian Army and announces to it: 'Congratulations. Henceforth Georgia is free. I wish you all the best.' And in response, Georgian servicemen will shout a grateful 'Hurrah' and swear an oath of loyalty to Russia. There is no other way out...."

The opposition claims: "The Russian general has already arrived." By "the Russian" they mean Lieutenant General Varden Nadibaidze, whom parliament confirmed in the post of defense minister in May of this year. (He was born 31 March 1939 in the village of Mleta in Georgia's Dushetskiy Rayon. He graduated from the Ordzhonikidze Military Automobile School and the Rear Services and Transportation Academy. He has served in the Kiev Military District, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and, since 1972, in the Transcaucasus, where he rose to deputy commander for armaments of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus.)

So why "Russian"? Nadibaidze is no arriviste; he is from the real and true Georgian heartland. Admittedly, during his years of service he has forgotten the language somewhat, and only gives interviews to journalists in Russian. And the opposition holds this against him. Once again, a general who has served in Russia has been appointed to the post of minister—and the opposition has noted this "point" too.

Everything can be corrected: The language can be brought up to standard, and the transfer (and that will doubtless happen) to the national army will be officially registered. Something else is far more important: The military department is not headed by an architect or a pianist but by a functioning general who does not represent the interests of any political parties, clans, or groups (unlike his predecessors). This happens once in a blue moon....

As for Russia, then, no matter what it might say, its interest is the same as before: Having for a neighbor a united, stable state. And if the "Russian" General Nadibaidze facilitates this, then what is there in this that runs counter to Georgia's national interests?

Afghan POW on Service With Azerbaijani Forces

944K1306A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
26 May 94 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Grigoryan: "End of a Legend?: A Captive Mujahidin Debunks the Myths"]

[Text] Various rumors, frequently bordering on fantasy, concerning mujahidin have been going around for several months now. The news media of Azerbaijan, skillfully stirring up interest in them, have been creating, not unsuccessfully, in the person of the mujahidin the heroic image of fighters for the faith and professional warriors. However, for a long time we were unable to find out what the mujahidin actually represent. Various gossip and rumors from Karabakh were highly contradictory, and it was difficult ascertaining anything specific. Altogether recently the Karabakhers succeeded in capturing near Fizuli a mujahidin whose evidence has thrown a good deal of light on the situation. Bakhtior Verbollakh Baberzai, commander of a "twenty" (20 men), was born in 1974, is from the Rashiddustan tribe, lived in the city of Mazar-e Sharif in the north of Afghanistan, and had left behind at home a mother and sister. During a bout of artillery shelling he was wounded in the eye and arm. Our doctors had to work very hard to get him back on his feet. What, for all that, has brought the mujahidin to Azerbaijan: Muslim solidarity or a chance to make some money?

The prisoner confessed that all the talk about fighting for the faith and against the infidel is merely an attempt to conceal the real reason for the appearance of the mujahidin in the zone of the Karabakh conflict. They were all promised generous compensation. Each warrior was promised approximately \$5,000 a month. Even before arriving in Azerbaijan, each Afghan was paid an advance of 50,000 toman. They were then taken to Beylagan, where the first disappointment awaited them. They were arrested in the city by a military patrol and were sent to prison, where they were treated none too kindly and, in addition, had all their money taken from them.

Babertzai received his baptism of fire near Goradiz, which is where they are positioned still. The talk about several thousand mujahidin is correct as far as it goes since there are at the front one [line missing] 200 or 300 men. They fight according to this schedule: One day a week they are at the front, the remaining days are time off. The mujahidin are allowed to go in their time off to Baku and Mingechaur. A special flight takes those wishing to spend their time off at home in Afghanistan.

All problems arising with the mujahidin are resolved by their compatriot, one Vaidallakh, who is to be found in Baku and who is their official representative.

The prisoner was the commander of a "twenty." Of the 20 men, 15 were Afghans, five, Azerbaijanis, whom, Babertzai

maintains, they killed themselves. Relations with the Azerbaijanis did not amount to much right from the start, and all contacts with them were reduced to a minimum. "Money and drugs—that's what [line missing] the prisoner, maintaining that the Azerbaijanis remember them only when they want to obtain narcotics. The drugs trade is highly profitable, he says, and the income from it is frequently higher than the compensation promised by the Government of Azerbaijan for military services.

Concerning habitation and sustenance, the prisoner confirmed that they eat and live separately, since their coreligionists "live like the impious." Medical services are organized in Beylagan, where the wounded and sick mujahidin are treated. Despite the promises of the authorities, not all return home, it is true. Lest they attract the discontent and anger of the relatives of the deceased and also to conceal the true picture of losses among the Afghans the Government of Azerbaijan does not send all the deceased home. Many of them have found eternal refuge on Azerbaijani soil.

As far as the rumors concerning clashes with Russians are concerned, the prisoner admitted that his group had not encountered them personally. But clashes between the mujahidin themselves, the supporters of various groupings and parties, occur very often, which is causing the authorities of Azerbaijan a great deal of trouble.

The prisoner is, despite it all, optimistic. He acknowledged that he misses his mother and sister very much and hopes, with Allah's help, for a safe return home.

ARMS TRADE

Conflicting Edict, Decree Put Arms Trade in Dilemma

PM0706100394 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Jun 94 p 3

[Aleksandr Sychev report: "Russia Could Again Be Competing Against Itself in the Arms Market"]

[Text] "Be in no hurry to engage in the arms trade independently. You are not ready for foreign markets." Contrary to expectations, that warning from Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the Russian president's personal representative at the "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company, did not give rise to any objections from the leaders of manufacturing enterprises or Russian weapons designers who are striving for the right to independent foreign economic activity.

The conference on the problems of further cooperation between "Rosvooruzheniye" and military-industrial complex enterprises was prompted by the dual position which the Russian arms trade has been in for a month now. On the one hand, the president's edict of 18 November last year brought in a state monopoly whose implementation prescribed the formation of the "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company. On the other hand, the government decree of 6 May this year to all intents and purposes abolished the state monopoly. The right to trade on foreign markets will once again be granted to enterprises—provided, admittedly, they are successfully certified for the purpose.

Russia's military-industrial complex, Shaposhnikov stated, is rapidly collapsing. The programs to convert production and to recycle accumulated weapons are not being implemented, state orders continue to fall, skilled cadres are leaving the sector, and production of a whole host of components—specifically, certain types of munitions—is being stopped. Some 400 military-industrial complex enterprises have been shut down. In the first five months of 1994 the Defense Ministry owed the defense sector over 4 trillion rubles [R]—not counting the R700 billion that was not paid last year. One way to avert collapse is to try to win a slice of Russia's exports pie, which has shrunk from \$22.6 billion in 1987 to just \$2 billion in weapons sold in 1993. Government Decree No. 479, which created another moot case in Russian legislation, was also a reflection of these interests.

The top state authorities seem not to have noticed the contradictions between the two acts. A Security Council session was scheduled for 8 June at which it had been proposed to set up a certification commission to study applications from people claiming the right to establish direct ties with foreign partners. The session was postponed to July—only because the same day sees the signing of contracts on the basis of plans for the delivery of MiG-29's to Malaysia, to which many of the people invited to the council session will have traveled.

Optimists at the session gave assurances that we are no strangers to differing interpretations and contradictions and that the system of Russian military-technical cooperation will be improved. Aleksey Shulunov, president of the League to Assist Defense Enterprises, believes that the end product will be to combine a state monopoly with broader

involvement of manufacturers and developers in military-technical cooperation. And the conference participants could not conceive of the arms trade without "Rosvooruzheniye," which has warned that it will not service firms that "strike out" on their own.

But pessimists recalled the recent period when there was a liberal attitude toward arms exports. Nobody has calculated how much Russia lost through the free-for-all that prevailed then. When Malaysia expressed interest in buying a major batch of MiG-29's, around 50 firms, state institutions, and ordinary Russian citizens vied with each other to offer it their services.

Not a single military-industrial complex enterprise has yet applied for a license. Stanislav Filin, deputy general director of the "Rosvooruzheniye" State Company, believes that there will be few applicants, and that even fewer licenses will be issued. Nonetheless, powerful science-and-production associations are pressuring small firms in an attempt to win their consent to have them represent their interests in foreign markets. It cannot be ruled out that these giants will once again start stealing clients from each other. After all, apart from the contradictory presidential edict and government decree, there are no other acts of legislation in Russia regulating the arms trade. Under these circumstances Russia will hardly be able to count on increasing its share of the world arms trade.

Decree on Enterprises Involved in Foreign Military-Technical Cooperation

94UM0435A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 May 94 p 5

[Decree No 479, 6 May 1994, of the Government of the Russian Federation "On Granting Enterprises the Right to Participate in the Russian Federation's Military-Technical Cooperation With Foreign Countries," signed by Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation V. Chernomyrdin]

[Text] In order to raise the effectiveness of the Russian Federation's military-technical cooperation with foreign countries, the Government of the Russian Federation resolves:

1. To approve the attached Statute on Certifying and Registering Enterprises for the Right to Export Armament, Military Equipment and Military Work and Services, and make it effective as of 1 May 1994.
2. To grant, to enterprises developing and manufacturing armament and military equipment that are certified and registered as participants of foreign economic activity in the area of military-technical cooperation, the right:

to seek foreign clients in countries in which military-technical cooperation is not prohibited, to demonstrate and transmit, in the course of negotiations, specifications and performance characteristics of armament and military equipment allowed for export, to communicate a tentative price agreed upon by the established procedure, and to conduct advertising and other marketing activities;

to sign contracts and to independently export, on the basis of licenses obtained by the established procedure, armament and military equipment manufactured by them over and above state defense orders, and military work and services;

to select intermediaries from among organizations that have received permits by the established procedure to engage in foreign economic activity in the area of military-technical cooperation.

3. As a partial amendment to item 3 of the Statute on the Procedure for Licensing Export and Import of Military Products (Work, Services) on the Territory of the Russian Federation, approved by Decree No 80, 28 January 1993, of the Council of Ministers and Government of the Russian Federation ("Sobraniye aktov Prezidenta i Pravitelstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii" [Collection of Acts of the President and Government of the Russian Federation], No 6, 1993, Article 484), to establish that spare parts, training and auxiliary property pertaining to armament and military equipment shipped to foreign countries earlier shall be exported, and the work of technical maintenance and repair of these items (including using series-manufactured associated items in exchange for those removed from production) shall be carried out, without a decision being rendered by the Government of the Russian Federation.

Statute on Registration of Enterprises for Arms Exports

94UM0435B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 May 94 p 5

[Statute on Certifying and Registering Enterprises for the Right to Export Armament, Military Equipment and Military Work and Services, approved by Decree No 479, 6 May 1994, of the RF Government; published in abbreviated form]

[Text] This Statute was written with the purpose of supporting implementation of Edict No. 507, 12 May 1992, of the President of the Russian Federation "On the Russian Federation's Military-Technical Cooperation With Foreign Countries," and it determines the procedure for certifying and registering enterprises developing and manufacturing armament and military equipment (referred to henceforth as enterprises) for the right to export armament, military equipment and military work and services (referred to henceforth as military-technical cooperation).

Enterprises shall be certified for the right to engage in military-technical cooperation by the Interdepartmental Commission on the Russian Federation's Military-Technical Cooperation With Foreign Countries at the request of the Russian Federation State Commission on Defense Sectors of Industry.

Enterprises shall be certified for the right to engage in military-technical cooperation within the range of armament and military equipment they develop and manufacture as objects of their activity. Export of military-technical products manufactured by other enterprises shall be permitted, if in accordance with technical standards the

indicated products are delivered as part of a system or a complex of armament manufactured by the exporting enterprise.

In order to undergo certification the enterprise shall forward the following set of documents to the RF State Committee for Defense Industry, to include a certificate from an agency of the Russian State Committee showing that an OKPO [All Russian Classification of Enterprises and Organizations] code has been awarded (eight symbols); a notarized copy of the founding documents (together with supplements and amendments) and a certificate of the enterprise's (organization's) registration as a subject of entrepreneurial activity in the Russian Federation; a certificate from the corresponding RF bank indicated existence of ruble and foreign exchange accounts, and information from the applicant indicating existence of accounts with foreign banks in its name or the name of companies of which it is a participant (if a foreign exchange account does not exist at the moment of submission of the application, information on it shall be presented to the Russian Federation Ministry Foreign Economic Relations and the Russian State Committee for Defense Industry after the account is opened); the enterprise's financial statements for the two preceding years (prior to registration).

The State Committee for Defense Industry shall forward copies of the application and appended documents to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Defense, the Federal Counterintelligence Service, the Ministry of Economics, the State Customs Committee and the Rosvooruzheniye State Company, and it shall schedule the date of the application's examination, which shall be conducted not later than 3 weeks from the day of its receipt. The enterprise shall be notified of the examination date a week in advance.

The enterprise's application shall be reviewed by the Certification Commission under the State Committee for Defense Industry (referred to henceforth as the commission), the personnel of which shall include representatives of the State Committee for Defense Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Defense, the Federal Counterintelligence Service, the Ministry of Economics and the Rosvooruzheniye State Company. The personnel of the commission shall be approved by the RF State Committee for Defense Industry in coordination with interested organizations.

A protocol shall be drawn up on the basis of the results of the commission's meeting.

Within a week after the meeting the State Committee for Defense Industry shall file a proposal with the Interdepartmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation With Foreign Countries on granting the enterprise the right to participate in military-technical cooperation, to which the meeting protocol and a draft decision of the RF Government shall be appended.

In the event that the proposal to grant the enterprise the right to engage in military-technical cooperation is rejected, the reasons for the rejection, and when necessary, the opinions of the members of the commission or of persons authorized for this by the appropriate organizations shall be

indicated in the meeting protocol. Within a week's time from the moment of the decision's adoption the enterprise shall be given a written reply together with the reasons for rejection.

Within a month's time the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations shall register the enterprise as a participant of foreign economic activity in the area of military-technical cooperation on the basis of a decision of the Government of the Russian Federation granting the enterprise the right to engage in military-technical cooperation. The registered enterprise shall receive an extract from the register, signed by the Russian Federation deputy minister of foreign economic relations and authenticated by the seal of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

The RF Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations shall maintain a register of enterprises having the right to engage in foreign economic activity in the area of military-technical cooperation, and it shall transmit information regarding inclusion of enterprises on the register to the State Committee for Defense Industry, the State Customs Committee, the Federal Counterintelligence Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property, the Russian Federal Service for Foreign Exchange and Export Control, the Rosvooruzheniye State Company, and trade representatives abroad.

Within 10 days after consummation of a transaction, an enterprise registered as a participant of foreign economic activity in the area of military-technical cooperation shall submit the following to the State Committee for Defense Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Defense, the Russian Federal Service for Foreign Exchange and Export Control and the Rosvooruzheniye State Company: copies of the contracts and supplementary agreements; information on progress in implementing the contracts (the stages of fulfillment of the contracts) and their fulfillment in their entirety; information on foreign currency received into the account of the enterprise for fulfilling work according to the contract (not submitted to the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense).

The Interdepartmental Commission on the Russian Federation's Military-Technical Cooperation With Foreign Countries shall have the right to suspend an enterprise's activity in military-technical cooperation at the request of the appropriate ministries and departments for a period of 3 months in the event of the enterprise's violation of RF legislation, decisions of the President and Government of the Russian Federation, instructions of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, the Russian Federal Service for Foreign Exchange and Export Control, and the RF State Customs Committee regarding military-technical cooperation, export control, and foreign exchange, financial and customs regulations on foreign economic activity; in the event of deliberate or negligent violation of legislation of foreign countries as a result of which economic, military or political damage may be inflicted upon the Russian Federation; in the event

of failure to fulfill obligations under state defense orders, and unlawful transactions; in the event of secrecy violation; in the event of failure to fulfill obligations in settling with suppliers of associated articles connected with export deliveries; in the event of unconscientious competition between Russian exporters in the foreign market.

The Interdepartmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation With Foreign Countries shall notify the corresponding ministries and departments of the decision adopted, and instruct them to draft a decision of the RF Government depriving the enterprise of the right to engage in military-technical activity.

On the basis of a decision adopted by the RF Government depriving the enterprise of its right to engage in military-technical cooperation, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations shall strike it's name from the register of enterprises have the right to engage in foreign economic activity in the area of military-technical cooperation, and so notify the corresponding ministries and departments as well as the Russian Federation's trade representatives abroad.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Losses Due to Weapons Sales Efforts

94UM0420A Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 82 (156) 5 May 94 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Kucherenko: "How Does Russia Trade in Weapons?"]

[Text] *There is probably no area that's a greater mystery to the layman than this. We all wholeheartedly believe that Russia and its powerful military-industrial complex are capable of conquering world markets, putting an end to the shameful dependence upon raw material exports. But should we console ourselves with illusions?*

Weapon Exports Comparable to Chocolate Imports

By October of last year a large group of experts from the Council of Ministers, the Central Bank, the Ministry of Security and the Interdepartmental Commission to Combat Corruption ended their inspection of the manner in which our foreign trade organizations are selling arms beyond the border. And at the same time, the manner in which orders of the president and government of the Russian Federation are being fulfilled.

As it turns out, the latter have been ignored. Trade in weapons and combat equipment proceeded unsupervised, as a result of which there was "significant political and economic damage to the state interests of Russia and, most importantly, its taxpayers."

The dramatic changes in policy and military doctrine that occurred since 1990, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, and the money reforms rended military-technical cooperation with 30 countries. In comparison with 1991, arms exports fell by a factor of three in 1992, to \$2.3 billion. In 1993 this indicator was barely over 2 billion. A figure close to that of exports of Mars and Snickers bars to Russia

last year. In the opinion of the inspectors, under these conditions the leadership of the MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] was unable to enter the new world markets and sell the accumulated reserves of defense goods.

From press files: "In 1993 the USA's share in exports of arms and military equipment to developing countries reached 57 percent. Russia's was 5.5 percent."—KOMMERSANT WEEKLY, 8 March 1994.

In the meantime, the work of Spetsvneshtekhnika and Oboroneksport—organizations subordinated to the MVES—was not subjected to any coordination. Unlawful acts were committed with the complicity of executives of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the then Vice-Prime Minister G. Khizha and his staff, and former executives of Spetsvneshtekhnika and Oboroneksport—S. Krasnov and S. Karaoglanov.

Even Though the Arsenals Were Stuffed Full

Krasnov and Karaoglanov proposed including manufacture of new lots of arms for export in the state defense order, even though the storage depots were stuffed full with the same weapons, and no contracts had been signed for their purchase. For example, Spetsvneshtekhnika and Oboroneksport ordered products amounting to \$5.4 billion. This order was approved by a 17 March 1992 decree of the Council of Ministers, signed by Gaydar. However, the military-industrial complex managed to produce only 3.1 billion worth of the "articles," of which only 1.1 billion worth were delivered abroad. For practical purposes, the other \$2 billion were pulled out of the pockets of taxpayers and deposited in arsenals in the form of guns and tanks. The budget deficit was increased. The inspection noted in this case that the MVES never did pay the plants in full for their work.

Whatever happened to these 2 billion? Three hundred eighty-two T-72S and T-80U tanks, 194 MSTAS and Giatsint self-propelled guns, 16 Uragan and Smerch multiple rocket launchers, 12 Tunguska self-propelled SAM launchers, and 16,000 missiles of different types and classes—enough to create a reserve for a good army. Add to this that by that time, the balance sheet of the MVES's foreign trade associations showed half a billion dollars' worth of unexported armament. Oboroneksport alone had 50 tanks, 1,800 missiles, 10 ships, 6 MiG-29s, small arms and ammunition, and spare parts for airplanes. At that moment ship builders were building four ships for export valued at \$70 million on the basis of orders of merchants from the MVES, at the same time that six finished vessels of the same class were standing around with nothing to do.

Even though it was unable to sell off these reserves, Oboroneksport once again placed orders in 1993 for 8 Uragan systems and 20 Shturm-S antitank systems, unsupported by contracts signed with buyers.

The inspectors reached the following conclusion: "In the last few years...the profit losses exceeded \$2.6 billion." The amount lost was almost as much as had been promised to us by the G7 in support of the "radical reforms." As much as the price of 20 million tonnes of oil. The conversion

program in Omsk Oblast is "sucking up" the equivalent of \$200 million. And completion of the nuclear-powered vessel "Ural," which ground to a halt at the building dock, will take 8 billion rubles, or \$5 million.

Azeri Rockets and Shturmoviki Sukhogo

Besides these, there are also some other losses that are harder to reckon. Because cases were revealed in which weapons were manufactured "under the table," circumventing state defense orders, contrary to Decree No 517, 24 July 1992, of the Government of the Russian Federation.

Thus, in April 1992 air force commander P. Deynekin and then-First Deputy Minister of Industry V. Glukhikh (now the chief of the Roskomoboronprom [Russian State Committee for Defense Industry]) signed an agreement in Russia's behalf to produce 180 type Kh-29 air-to-ground missiles in Azerbaijan, allegedly on the basis of an order from the Ministry of Defense for Su-25 ground-attack aircraft. An order amounting to 153.4 million of the old rubles was placed with the Iglim Association. This decision was illegal at least because Azerbaijan was not in the CIS at that time. Deynekin further violated the law "On Deliveries of Products and Goods for State Needs" by signing a decision on the basis of which manufacture of the Kh-29 was paid for not by the Ministry of Defense but by a certain small enterprise called Ekooptimum, which had no right to engage in such transactions. Moreover, there has been no demand for such missiles for several years already, which is why the Ministry of Defense had no plans for ordering them.

Iglim made them. Though not for our air forces, but for export. In this case Ekooptimum paid for a total of 10 units. By as early as February 1993 Deynekin and A. Bratukhin, the first deputy chairman of the Roskomoboronprom, once again signed a similar agreement with the Azeris, which was approved by the then-Vice Prime Minister G. Khizha. This time the object was 320 Kh-29s for 312 million, and once again, in circumvention of the state defense order. In violation of the 27 March 1993 presidential edict, deliveries of these missiles were later freed from payment of customs duties without a ruling by the Foreign Exchange and Economic Commission, the Ministry of Defense and the MVES.

Iglim managed to manufacture 175 missiles, which were then fitted out by over 40 Russian state-owned plants. Their ownership was then transferred to a limited partnership—the Shturmoviki Sukhogo Concern, headed by V. Babak. Obtaining financing from the budget, it was this concern that paid the Azeris for their work. It also signed an unlawful agreement with Iglim, also disadvantageous to Russia, to export the Kh-29s and divide the hard currency profits—60 percent to Azerbaijan and 40 percent to the concern. But they were unable to sell any of the missiles, and the money diverted by Shturmoviki Sukhogo became frozen in these goods.

The Mechanics of Enrichment

Yes, we did sell weapons abroad, but in all cases through middlemen. And the money that could have been gone to the hard-up military-industrial complex and budget wound up in the pockets of dubious dealers.

From the files of NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA:

"...The inspection established that in many cases foreign trade organizations of the Russian MVES sold arms and military equipment through Russian and foreign middlemen in violation of presidential edicts...No 507, 12 May 1992...and No 1621s, 24 December 1992.... Some high-placed officials in a number of ministries and in the Government of the Russian Federation were unfortunately drawn into these unlawful actions.... Commercial organizations were enriched at the expense of state resources."

In October 1992 Spetsvneshtekhnika, which was headed by Major General V. Braylovskiy, sold the latest model of the T-80U tank, the Tunguska SAM launcher and other equipment worth \$10.7 million to the Liberian firm A. Bidner, Inc. with the support of Vice-Prime Minister Khizha, receiving \$1.1 million in commissions for this. This equipment was to be subsequently delivered to England. What was it, we wonder, that kept Braylovskiy from selling the goods directly to the British, without giving the lion's share of the profits to a middleman? In this case Spetsvneshtekhnika siphoned off a considerable amount of money to the Russian Military-Industrial Association, supposedly to fund the search for a customer. Does this mean that the deal now involved two middlemen? To make matters worse, this association is a purely commercial venture, and it has no right to engage in military-technical cooperation.

On the other hand, Braylovskiy and Khizha violated Yeltsin's Edict No 1621, according to which export of the T-80U was to be strictly prohibited prior to 1993, while export of the Tunguska was not foreseen at all.

Here is another example. With the assistance of Glazyev, the head of the MVES, and that same Khizha, and jointly with our MiG-Servis firm, the Main Administration for Collaboration and Cooperation (GOSK), headed by V. Trofimov, who was subsequently dismissed from his position, sold aviation property and documentation (for the MiG-23 and MiG-29) to the Russian-Singaporean venture Remora Ltd. for a total of \$5 million. All of this was shipped to Angola.

As it turned out, MiG-Servis is a limited partnership established by the MiG Joint-Stock Scientific Production Complex, the GUSK and Spetsvneshtekhnika; it possesses a negligible amount of as yet unpaid authorized capital totaling R2 million. Moreover, because the GUSK and Spetsvneshtekhnika are state-owned organizations, what we have here is commercialization of the work of public officials—officials who enjoy a profit from something that they are supposed to do anyway by the nature of their work.

What is remarkable is that in selling goods to Remora, this firm was actually concluding a deal with itself. Because Remora is an offshore organization off the Isle of Man, 40 percent of which is owned by MiG-Servis. (The remaining 60 percent are owned by Singapore's CMI Impax.)

The inspection established that MiG-Servis appeared on many licenses and customs declarations as the manufacturer and shipper of the fighters, which did not correspond to reality (it did not even have the right to participate in

military-technical cooperation). On the other hand, Remora did not have a permit to purchase goods from either the Angolans or the English. So it happens that by channeling state property to its offshore middleman, MiG-Servis unlawfully received a quarter of a million dollars.

By the same means MiG-Servis sold state property to Germany in 1993 to reequip the Bundeswehr's MiG-29 regiment. According to data of the Russian Federation's Foreign Intelligence Service and the Counterintelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Security, M. R. Valdenberg (the general director of MiG-Servis) allegedly purchased an aircraft repair plant in Dresden, on the basis of which the firm Elbe Flugzeugwerke was established. In the meantime, the FRG's federal department for military equipment purchases did not authorize MiG-Servis to purchase spare parts for MiG-29s in Russia. We note in this case that despite the fact that around 500 warplanes were idling at our air force bases, permission to export only four MiGs was given by a 12 May 1992 order of the RF Government!

More than enough interesting things were discovered. There was also the fact of the unlawful issuance of a license by Deputy Minister V. Shibayev of the MVES for delivery of two portable Igla surface-to-air systems together with 60 125-millimeter projectiles to the Germans through the Liberia's EBC Investment Corp. and Germany's GLS. And there is the fact that five Gardeniya-IFU ECM stations went to Egypt by way of Bahrain's Continental Trading Center with the blessing of MVES GUVTS [Main Administration for Military-Technical Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] chief Kotelkin.

With the connivance of its officials, Russia turned its profit over to numerous resellers who, according to the inspection data, had neither permits from the governments of the importing countries to make military purchases, nor end-user certificates. Unfortunately, these are not isolated facts.

The Old With a New Face?

This is only a small fraction of what is happening in our arms trade. But what are the authorities doing to curb this lawlessness?

Spetsvneshtekhnika, Oboroneksport, and the GUSK [Main Administration for Collaboration and Cooperation] of the MVES were abolished, and the monopoly on arms trade was transferred to the state-owned company Rosvooruzheniye (RV). Will this make things better for us?

It would be worthwhile to acquaint ourselves with the executive leadership of the new company.

From press files: "The founders of the state-owned company Rosvooruzheniye are people known in the country: Vladimir Shumeyko (who pushed through the edict establishing Rosvooruzheniye), Oleg Soskovets (who approved the edict in behalf of the government), and Viktor Chernomyrdin (who approved the company charter)"—KOMMERSANT WEEKLY, 8 March 1994.

Supervision over observance of the interests of the state in the company was assigned to A. Korzhakov, the chief of the president's secret service. We must give Korzhakov's talents

their due: He commands the secret service, and somewhere he picked up on the fine points of international arms trade. This normally requires graduating from an economic VUZ, familiarization with international law, and experience in foreign trade. But he managed to do all of this quite easily, as a second job to protecting the president.

Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov was appointed B. N.'s representative at RV in February.

Obviously the two of them will easily replace the entire staff of specialists from the disbanded Interdepartmental Commission to Combat Crime and Corruption, and at the same time, manage to get on with it in the absence of a state concept of military-technical cooperation in Russia. And this concept is exactly where those infamous state interests which Shaposhnikov and Korzhakov are called upon to protect are supposed to be expounded.

From press files: "...Rosvooruzheniye intends to carry out its activities through authorized banks—Menatep, Mostbank, Intermed, Moscow National..."—KOMMERSANT WEEKLY, 8 March 1994.

Once again, familiar structures, which spare no efforts for the good of the motherland.

We can say with confidence that the structure of RV is imperfect. For example, the company has been granted the right to export some military products without having to draft special government permits, and on only on the basis of coordination with Grachev's department. With its recently created Unified Automated System for Supervising Strategic Exports, the MVES has completely distanced itself from this work. Nor has anything been said about the role to be played in this by the Federal Service for Supervision of Foreign Exchange, to which the Council of Ministers delegated its rights of implementing general state foreign economic policy. Won't this once again lead to lack of supervision? After all, RV will begin setting the rules of armed trade and acting as a merchant itself.

On the other hand, RV has been proclaimed to be a state-owned enterprise, one which can establish subsidiary companies not only in Russia but also abroad—investment, insurance, dealer (trade), trust and other kinds of companies. Attraction of foreign middlemen to consummate the deals is also foreseen. At the same time the company has the right to issue permits for export of military products. Doesn't this perpetuate the possibility for public officials to finance private middlemen under the table? After all, RV is a cumbersome organization, and consequently it wouldn't be difficult at all for its workers to establish a firm for themselves somewhere on the Isle of Man or in Liberia, and sell state-owned weapons through it, depriving the country of hard currency profits; in the exact same way that the firms MiG-Servis and Remora Ltd. did.

Strengthening Statehood While Dispensing With Supervision?

In general, although RV is considered to be a state-owned company, the rights it has been granted are purely those of a private company. And its general director operates as the sole and absolute owner. Thus, the state is not responsible

for the obligations of state-owned RV, and it is given the right to dispose of its property and profits, and acquire and alienate property. Moreover, "other rights may also be granted to the company by the government of the Russian Federation." RV has also managed to acquire the possibilities for creating funds that are not called for directly by its charter. But isn't this legalization of that absence of supervision that last year's inspection revealed?!

For example, RV is endowed with the right not only to maintain a monopoly on trade in products of the military-industrial complex, but also to invest into its development. This combination of functions, plus the absence of supervision, makes it possible for officials to siphon profits from the sale of public wealth into subsidiaries, especially foreign subsidiaries. And if the authorities do in fact wish to strengthen statehood and put things in order, it would be more reasonable to make Rosvooruzheniye only a merchant that would transfer the profits strictly into the federal budget—under the watchful eye of the authorities. These resources should be invested only by an entirely different state structure, one not associated with RV. Separation of functions creates an obstacle to embezzlement of state property.

Who Stands to Gain From a Monopoly?

In this case, Rosvooruzheniye enjoys a complete monopoly over export of military equipment. At the same time, the procedure currently effective in the USA is as follows: After filling a state order, a military-industrial company can then proceed to work independently. Most importantly, as long as it does not violate the state concept of military-technical cooperation, the law, and international agreements signed by the government. And of course, the buyer must have an end-user certificate and a permit from the government of its country allowing it to engage in such transactions.

Russian weapon manufacturers—the immediate producers, who have established regional associations—also demand the same procedure. After all, their enterprises are perishing from poverty, the collectives are falling apart, and cities in which defense industry is located are suffering. But those in Moscow who are working to strengthen statehood have no wish to grant them this right. This is not to mention the fact that we do not have a concept of military-technical cooperation!

Why is one needed? A monopoly on trade, you see, is a unique possibility for unconscientiously plundering the manufacturer, for imposing low purchase prices on him, or for raking in an ungodly percentage for intermediary services. And the manufacturer can do nothing about it—he himself is prohibited from engaging in trade. You see, an official who markets the goods of some tank plant across the border has to make some money for himself, and for his subsidiary organization, and for the Western middleman. What is left in this case for the labor collectives? And it looks like when the military-industrial complex descends to abject poverty, the middlemen will come to it as its privatizing saviors; with wallets bulging at the expense of the plants.

This future is a fully possible one. In March 1992 Volskiy's experts, who analyzed the behavior of the military-industrial complex under the conditions of the Gaydar-supervised disintegration, established that defense plants could not enter the foreign market because the commissions foreign trade organizations were demanding were too high. Describing the woeful situation resulting from the severing of ties in the former USSR, in spring 1993 V. Mashits, chairman of the Committee for Economic Cooperation with Commonwealth Member States, noted that state-owned intermediaries, which had cornered all of the quotas and privileges in advance, were demanding up to 25 percent of the amount of a transaction!

One could, of course, also understand the proponents of the monopoly enjoyed by RV. It is needed in order that independent merchants would not get in each other's way in foreign markets, bringing down prices and inflicting damage on the country. But then a strictly fixed low percentage for intermediary services needs to be legislated, and a judicial mechanism needs to be foreseen concurrently. One which would make it possible for the weapon manufacturer to go to the Antimonopoly Committee, and make the foreign trade worker live up to his responsibilities in the event of his negligence or acts of extortion. But it's somehow hard to believe that the present government will do this.

'Unique' Russian Exhibits at 'Aircraft Engines-94' Show

PM2305105794 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1600 GMT 14 May 94

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report from Moscow "Aircraft Engines-94" exhibition by A. Peslyak and M. Fokeyev, identified by caption]

[Text] [161545] [Peslyak over video of entrance to exhibition, first sentence partly obliterated by music] In addition to aircraft engines, car, tractor, and ship engines and other power plant are on show. Engines produced in Perm, St. Petersburg, Omsk, Ufa, and Barnaul are by no means inferior to the output of the world-famous BMW or Pratt & Whitney companies.

Academician Kuznetsov, for example, is presenting his new engine developed in Samara—a unique environment-friendly and economical engine for large-capacity aircraft. [video shows movie of engine in action]

The Mozhayskiy Academy, which produces the nuclear-powered Topaz on which the Americans are so keen, has discovered a new motion principle. Mikhail Ostrikov, the creator of the miracle magnet, sees a great future in the skies and on earth for this essentially everlasting engine. [161627] [video shows general views of exhibition and described exhibits]

Impact of Conversion on Job Prospects

PM0106101494 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 27 May 94 First Edition p 3

[Interview with A. Savenkov, director of the Russian Federal Employment Service's "Intellectual Resources" inter-regional center, by Inna Rozanova; date and place of interview not stated: "If You Have No Job You Cannot Lose

It"—first paragraph is introduction; passages between slant-lines are Rozanova insertions]

[Text] The clan of defense monsters accustomed to a comfortable existence at the state's expense has found itself in the clutches of conversion. The panic over the absence of orders for research and development and production reigns not only in the top echelons of the military-industrial complex leadership. Highly qualified cadres—society's intellectual elite and virtuoso workers—have found themselves unemployed. A. Savenkov, director of the Russian Federal Employment Service "Intellectual Resources" inter-regional center, tells the tale.

[Rozanova] Aleksandr Valentinovich, in periods of social upheavals the Russian intelligentsia traditionally asks age-old questions: "Who is to blame?" and "what is to be done?" How would you answer the first question?

[Savenkov] It is not the government, not any parties or legislative organs, but solely the leaders of the military-industrial complex enterprises who are to blame for the situation which has taken shape. The economic situation dictates its own laws. And, of course, one can name dozens of enterprises where the leaders perform miracles of heroism, saving the unique formations entrusted to them. A fine example is the capital's steel scientific research institute, which has now become a joint-stock company and continues to work for the defense industry. The collective headed by director Vladimir Shashkin has been able to face up to the market.

[Rozanova] The concept of conversion has been in existence for a long time now....

[Savenkov] There are conceptual documents. But a concept is something unsteady, a subjective view of objective processes. It is not even a program, not a plan of measures, still less a law. What is needed is a law, a clear law down to the trivial details, so that when it is implemented the features of the country's sectors and regions can be considered. I myself am a supporter of swift, resolute actions and am entirely in favor of the transformations initiated by Yegor Gaydar. But the most complex thing is that each person, whether he is unemployed, a scientist or a millionaire, is a person, not a machine. So the law on conversion should first of all consider the realities of the person and only second should it consider the economic aspect of the problem.

[Rozanova] Last year alone about 1.5 million people were laid off from defense production facilities. Are the unemployment growth rates in the defense industry high now?

[Savenkov] By the end of last year the rate in the defense complex was lower. People are being misled into thinking that all financing problems will soon be resolved and state orders and credits will be issued. But that faith is leaving people. Another layoff of manpower from military-industrial complex enterprises is forecast.

/From the newspaper's files

According to the figures of the Russian Federal Employment Service as of early 1994:

- in "closed" cities every second unemployed person is aged 18-29 while throughout Russia as a whole young people make up one-third of the total number of unemployed;
- the unemployed who have been unable to find work for 12 months or more comprise 17.9 percent of the total number of unemployed in the "closed" cities. Throughout Russia as a whole this figure is considerably lower, to wit 12.9 percent./

[Rozanova] Well, is there any concealed unemployment—switching to a part-time working day or week?

[Savenkov] Yes, and this is now one way of preserving the cadres potential. The military-industrial complex knows that usually there are no more than five high-class specialists in a particular avenue of scientific research at the defense industry's enterprises and scientific research institutes and it is enough for two of them to "fall out of the nest" for the remaining three to be unable to do anything to ensure that the enterprise is not reduced to chaos and is not faced with the need to change its technological orientation, its sectorial direction, and its products list.

But in general terms, relying on salvation with the aid of concealed unemployment is to hope that a soap bubble will last an eternity.

[Rozanova] One of the main cadres problems of conversion is the loss of the level of skill of defense production workers. But there is also the opinion that, on the contrary, workers from military plants will have to improve their qualifications in order to learn to make teapots instead of missiles—after all, these people were used to fulfilling orders on supermodern equipment while workers in civilian industry are literally working miracles on antiquated machine tools.

[Savenkov] Paradoxical though it may seem, those deprived of their ultramodern equipment will have to be retrained: They will be unable to compete with workers on obsolete machine tools. And these people will have to summon up the courage to realize that nothing terrible has happened.

The demands of the day—to be prepared to change your profession and undergo retraining—will enable people to survive in the most difficult situation. Another characteristic of the current period is the education of the population in the spirit of professional mobility. So they do not try to chain themselves to the city or settlement where their nearest and dearest are buried, where they have developed friendships with colleagues, or even where they have family. People must be taught to move around in search of work—in order to save their families, their friendships, and even their cities or settlements.

[Rozanova] Outstanding specialists, once preoccupied with defense topics, are now free to think and work. Many of them have decided to change their lifestyle, setting up small businesses, for example, based on their departments or

design bureaus, and without demanding massive credits from the state. But can you say that small businesses are a solution?

[Savenkov] They are one of the most effective and honest ways out of the present grim situation. They are a way of helping people not lose their skills, but retain them for better days. But some leaders are finding it difficult to take such steps, because it deprives them of their power monopoly. They are clinging to power to the bitter end and are even refusing to lease premises and equipment to their own people and are not registering small businesses, and this is a bad policy by bad leaders.

What would I recommend? Under the guidance of the administration, conclude articles of association with small businesses based on departments or design bureaus, so that when the "light at the end of the tunnel" appears, all this potential will work for the benefit of the mother enterprise. Not allowing premises and equipment to be privatized, but leasing them out.

/From the newspaper's files

According to the figures of the Russian Federal Employment Service, as of 1 January 1994 in the "closed" cities the proportion of unemployed people with higher and secondary specialized education was 53.2 percent of the total number of unemployed, while for Russia as a whole this indicator was much lower—37.9 percent./

[Rozanova] The mono-cities are literally on the brink of extinction now....

[Savenkov] The mono-cities are the result of the GULAG principle in the building of our society. There are two diametrically opposed options for resolving the problem. The first is a dead city which all the people have left and where all the windows are broken, which, incidentally, is not uncommon abroad. The second option is that the state shrugs aside all principles and market laws and simply provides the money to feed these people.

The best option of all is that of compromise. I think the first thing the administration should do in each city is to make an inventory of manpower resources in conjunction with the employment service. Usually, the employment service's team of experts consists of leading specialists in the sphere of economics, law, business, sociology, and psychology, and as a rule the group is able to make a diagnosis within a week. Then, with the active participation of the local trade union and administration, the working people should be briefed on the situation the enterprise is in and on what could happen if this or that path is taken. They should be asked what other jobs they could do. What other speciality are they prepared to be retrained in?

[Rozanova] And what is your view of the problem of the "nuclear brain drain" abroad?

[Savenkov] If you think about it, what exactly are we trying to ban? The spread of knowledge on the most efficient and ecologically clean form of energy, which resembles in its parameters the energy of the sun, wind, and tides? If it is a question of weapons, that is a problem for the politicians.

But let us not drag into political battles scientists who can find a solution to practically any problem if the finance is available. If there is a financially advantageous order to be had, even if it is directed against humanity, people will always be found who will carry it out. The fight should be against the "clients for death," not the engineers and workers.

And what if you look at the "brain drain" the other way round? If the transplantation of specialists to other countries is regarded as aid to neighbors, as a friendly act? This will help our country's science too. After working for a given period, our specialists will come home rich and happy.

[Rozanova] Judging by your answers to my questions, the "Intellectual Resources" center has done good theoretical work. But has it yielded a practical return?

[Savenkov] Of course. We are testing our theory at about 10 settlements in Moscow Oblast—in the cities of Zhukovskiy, Odintsovo, Fryazino, Balashikha, Kaliningrad, Pushkino, Pavlovo-Posada, and Dubna, and the settlement of Kurovskoye in Orekhovo-Zuyevskiy Rayon. For instance, at the "Istok" enterprise which is undergoing conversion in the science city of Fryazino, in less than six weeks this year, with active financial and organizational assistance from Viktor Ponomarev, director of the Moscow Oblast Employment Center, more than 50 new jobs for women were created, for the "Istok" employees who had been subject to cuts and for the unemployed people of the city of Fryazino. A line was installed and production started up for the production of Russian-designed hearing aids at "Istok" in record time.

/From the newspaper's files

According to the figures of the Russian Federal Employment Service:

—In the first quarter of 1994 in Russia as a whole the number of unemployed increased 29.7 percent, whereas in the "closed" cities it increased 22.8 percent.

—As of 1 April 1994 in Russia as a whole there were 4.7 unemployed citizens for every vacancy registered with the employment service. In the "closed" cities this indicator was, on average, 4.1./

[Rozanova] All the same, can we end our conversation today on an optimistic note?

[Savenkov] We not only can, but should. Because Russia is still here, whether people like it or not. Russia is an unsinkable cruiser, and no storms will make it sink to the bottom of history.

Arms Producers Blame State Bureaucracy for Plight

*MK0306101094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
3 Jun 94 p 2*

[Pavel Felgengauer report in the "Defense Sector" column: "The Impoverished Military Industrial Complex Finds Freedom Beyond Its Means. Arms Producers Confer With State Company Rosvooruzheniye Leadership"]

[Text] May's government Resolution 479 granted manufacturers the right independently to export arms. It would be

quite natural to interpret the liberation of "military-technical cooperation" as a victory by the military industrial complex. Those "liberated," however, seem to be of a different opinion.

Yesterday a conference was held in Moscow between main arms and military equipment producers and the leadership of the state company Rosvooruzheniye on "prospects of military-technical cooperation" under new conditions. Rosvooruzheniye representatives (Marshal Shaposhnikov, Viktor Samoylov, and department chiefs) called for unity and partnership in the common struggle for survival by Russia's defense industry and its army. The manufacturers related amazingly well to this appeal.

As of now, arms producers may choose their own intermediaries but virtually all "liberated" plant directors and general designers have spoken in favor of continuing cooperation with Rosvooruzheniye. Moreover, manufacturers consider Resolution 479 harmful or at best senseless. The fact is that in the past two years many arms producers have managed to secure a whole number of individual "preferential" government resolutions and edicts. Now these firms and research and production associations will again have to undergo the protracted process of bureaucratic licensing to obtain the rights they enjoyed in the past.

Besides, on their own, the producers did not sell very many weapons. Vladimir Kuzmin, general director of the Dementyev MAPO [possibly Moscow Aviation Production Association] (MiG aircraft), said that in the past two years MAPO spent \$3 million for advertising and promotion (air shows, and so forth) of MiG fighter aircraft abroad. Yet in spite of dozens of business contracts, "not a single serious hard currency contract has so far been concluded." (The Malaysian contract has been prepared with the participation of Rosvooruzheniye). MAPO's general director called on all manufacturers to cooperate with Rosvooruzheniye, which not only has representative offices and old business links in many countries but also available resources for easy credits against contracts signed. The producers themselves have funds neither for marketing nor making prepayments to component manufacturers in order to meet contract terms. Military industrial complex directors are not content with the conditions set by commercial banks.

What conference participants saw as an artificially inflated rate of the ruble to the dollar and also rapidly increasing overheads cripple the effectiveness of arms exports. Export production of ammunition and spare parts is currently losing money in all cases, while deductions and taxes imposed by the Finance Ministry have made arms export—for instance, to India, which pays in "clearing" dollars or rupees—unattractive, and therefore the contracts concluded are not being honored.

In any event, all military industrial complex "generals" are at one in that their chief enemy is not Rosvooruzheniye but state bureaucracy, which hinders the expeditious exporting of new weapons. The conference criticized most the Finance Ministry and the Defense Ministry's Export Control Committee.

Military Industrial Complex Prepares for Finance Conference

*MK0706082094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7 Jun 94 p 2*

[V.A. report under the "Military-Industrial Complex" rubric: "Industrial Capital Wants To Merge With Banking Capital"]

[Text] A press conference at the General Staff Academy was held within the framework of preparation for the international conference entitled "Integration of Banking and Industrial Capital" scheduled for November. Its venue was perhaps supposed to underline once more that the initiative comes from the military-industrial complex enterprises. No wonder: They have been faced with the fait accompli of a "precipitous conversion." Very indicative in this sense was the question to participants in the press conference: "Is there today a military-industrial complex in Russia at all?" It was asked by none other than a major general of the General Staff Academy.

Another general, Yuriy Yashin, chairman of the State Technological Commission under the Russian Federation president, stated confidently that there is a military-industrial complex in Russia. What there is not is a program of conversion as such. The present federal budget cannot provide sufficient financing to all sectors, even less so to such a capital-intensive sector as the military-industrial complex. At the same time, commercial banking structures are making no active motions in this direction. This, despite the fact that they have invested in foreign banks approximately the worth of today's budget deficit.

The planned conference according to the concept of its organizers—the Russian Federation Ministry of the Economy, the State Committee on Defense Industry, the Ministry on Economic Cooperation, the Association of Russian Banks, and also a number of powerful state and commercial structures—is supposed to reverse this negative tendency. The conference is expected to result in producing specific methods for the merger.

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